Telecoms Package Plenary Voting List
From La Quadrature du Net
Jump to navigationJump to searchThe following tables present a voting list with some comments only about amendment raising concerns for La Quadrature du Net. The printable (PDF) files give voting lists with all amendments put to vote, as shown in European Parliament's voting list format.
- Voting list on Trautmann report FINAL PRINTABLE VERSION
- Voting list on Harbour report FINAL PRINTABLE VERSION
Contents
COD/2007/0247 - Trautmann report (networks and services)
| Amending | Amended | Topic | Am. # | Source | Advice | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trautmann Art. 2.6a | Access Art. 9.1 | Net Neutrality | 98 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "restrictions ... policies" | ITRE | 0 | no objections on this part |
| " | " | " | 98 part 2: "restrictions ... policies" | " | -- | restrictions on access to services and applications endangers net neutrality |
| Trautmann Art. 2.8 | Access Art. 12 | Net Neutrality | 100 part 1: Everything except paragraph 2e) | ITRE | + | no objections on this part, and even some good support for interoperability |
| " | " | " | 100 part 2: paragraph 2e) | " | -- | obligations about "intellectual property rights" (paragraph 2, point e) is out-of-scope |
| Trautmann Annex I.2.g | Authorisation Annex I.A.19 | Net Neutrality | 120 | ITRE | ++ | deletion is good, since relation with EUCD and IPRED is out-of-scope |
| Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea | Framework Art. 8.4.g | Net Neutrality | 139 | Verts/ALE | ++ | restrictions subject to criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality |
| Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.g | Net Neutrality | 130=142 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | ++ | delete "lawful" |
| Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.g | Net Neutrality | 61 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "and for this purpose ... lawful content" | ITRE | - | can still be dangerous with reference to Universal Service directive if amendment 112 Harbour is voted |
| " | " | " | 61 part2: "and for this purpose ... lawful content" | " | -- | notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package |
| Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | 3-strikes | 132 part 1: "(ea) In paragraph 4 ... creative content industries" | Toubon, Hieronymi and al. | - | as EDPS has recommended, cooperation between ISP and copyright industry can be good if completed by an amendment to clarify that it should not allow for systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage |
| " | " | " | 132 part 2: in order to foster ... codes of conduct" | " | -- | opens door to 3-strikes approach by "joint-industry solutions" |
| Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | Net Neutrality/Judicial Power | 138 part 1: "applying the principle ... judicial authorities" excluding "notably in accordance ... expression and information" | Bono, Cohn-Bendit, Roithová and al. | +++ | restore judicial authority |
| " | " | " | 138 part 2: "notably in accordance ... expression and information" | " | + | restore judicial authority with reference to ECHR |
| " | " | " | 138 part 3: "except where ... public morality" | " | ++ | restore judicial authority with exceptions imposed by subsidiarity principle |
| Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | Net Neutrality | 131 | IND/DEM | ++ | restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality |
| Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | Net Neutrality | 143 | GUE/NGL | ++ | restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality |
| Trautmann Art. 1.9 | Framework Art. 9 | Net Neutrality | 64 | ITRE | -- | "cultural and media policy objectives" opens door to filtering, stick to "promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity" |
| Trautmann Art. 1.24a | Framework Art. 25a | Technology Mandates / Internet Filtering | 133 | GUE/NGL | ++ | prevents Internet filtering |
| Trautmann Art. 2.8.ba | Access Art. 12.2 | Net Neutrality | 141 | Verts/ALE | ++ | delete obligations about "intellectual property rights" |
COD/2007/0248 - Harbour report (network user's rights, privacy, consumer protection, ...)
Remark: as you can see on this screenshot (taken on Sep. 23 2008, 14:09), amendments 158 and 166 to Harbour report are not accessible on the European Parliament website, although they are included on the official voting list published by tabling office. We have managed to get a paper copy of amendment 166 and recommend to support it, but content of amendment 158 is still unknown, therefore we advise to reject it by precautionary principle. Update 17:41: both amendments have now been published, it is about security and introduce DRM to render personal data unintelligible,in the event of accidental or unlawful destruction, loss or alteration or unauthorized disclosure of or access to personal data. We still recommend to vote against amendment 158, and for amendment 166.
| Amending | Amended | Topic | Am. # | Source | Advice | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Harbour Rec. 14d | DRM | 14 part1: "Since inconsistent ... across the Community" | IMCO | - | can be dangerous wrt DRM (as part 2) by allowing "other measures" | |
| " | " | 14 part2: "and, if necessary ... Community" | " | -- | allows DRM imposed by NRAs approved by Commission | |
| Harbour Rec. 28a | Privacy | 30 part 1: "For the purpose ... with other data" | IMCO + LIBE | -- | IP address as personal data | |
| " | " | 30 part2: "within two years ... supervisors" | " | -- | IP address as personal data in Community legislation | |
| Harbour Rec. 30a | Privacy | 34 | IMCO + LIBE | --- | extends ePrivacy to IPR | |
| Harbour Rec. 30b | Privacy | 35 | IMCO + LIBE | -- | "fundamental rights" include protection of IPR | |
| Harbour Art. 1.12 | Universal Service Art. 20.2.1.b | Net Neutrality | 62 part1: "services provided ... territory" | IMCO | 0 | no objections on this part |
| " | " | " | 62 part2: "information on ... and services" | " | -- | service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities |
| " | " | " | 62 part3: "the service quality ... initial connection" | " | 0 | no objections on this part |
| " | " | " | 62 part4: "and any ... provider" | " | -- | service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities |
| Harbour Art. 1.12 | Universal Service Art. 20.2.2 | 3-strikes | 67 part 1: "The contract shall ... networks and services" | IMCO | 0 | no objection on this part |
| " | " | " | 67 part 2: "to engage ... provided" | " | -- | opens door to 3-strikes approach |
| Harbour Art. 1.12 | Universal Service Art. 21.4 | Net Neutrality | 75 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "inform subscribers ... of their choice" [sub c)] | IMCO | 0 | no objection on this part |
| " | " | " | 75 part 2: "inform subscribers ... of their choice" [sub c)] | " | -- | allows restrictions based on lawfulness |
| Harbour Art. 1.12 | Universal Service Art. 21.4a | 3-strikes | 76 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "the common uses ... their consequences; and" [point a)] | IMCO | 0 | no objection on this part |
| " | " | " | 76 part 2: "the common uses ... their consequences; and" [point a)] | " | -- | opens door to 3-strikes approach |
| Harbour Art. 1.20 | Universal Service Art. 33.2a | 3-strikes | 112 | IMCO | -- | opens door to 3-strikes approach |
| Harbour Art. 1.20 | Universal Service Art. 33.3 | Interoperability | 113 | IMCO | - | weakens interoperability clause |
| Harbour Art. 1.21 | Universal Service Art. 34.1.2a | Judicial Power | 117 | IMCO | -- | encourages out-of-courts procedures |
| Harbour Art. 2.5a | ePrivacy Art. 14.1 | DRM | 134 part 1: "in implementing ...technical features" | IMCO + LIBE | + | goes back to current inital version of ePrivacy directive |
| " | " | " | 134 part 2: "including ... rights by users" | " | -- | allows standardisation of DRM for purposes of detecting, intercepting, or preventing infringements of IPR |
| " | " | " | 134 part 3: "are imposed ... Member States" | " | + | goes back to current inital version of ePrivacy directive |
| Harbour Art. 1.13.b | Universal Service Art. 22.3 | DRM | 155=172 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | rewords am193 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access |
| Harbour Art. 1.13.b | Universal Service Art. 22.3 | DRM | 193 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | even if references to "lawfulness" have been deleted since previous amendment 81, still opens doors to standardisation of DRM |
| Harbour Art. 1.13.b | Universal Service Art. 22.3 | DRM | 81 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the word "lawful" (twice) | IMCO | 0 | no objection on this part |
| " | " | " | 81 part 2: "lawful" (twice) | " | -- | opens doors to standardisation of DRM |
| Harbour Art. 1.16 | Universal Service Art. 28.2a | Net Neutrality | 173 | Verts/ALE | ++ | limits restrictions to security and integrity |
| Harbour Art. 1.16 | Universal Service Art. 28.2a | Net Neutrality | 101 | IMCO | -- | gives power to NRAs for requiring ISPs to impose restrictions |
| Harbour Art. 1.19a | Universal Service Art. 32a | 3-strikes | 166 | GUE/NGL | ++ | garantees access to content, services and application |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.aa | ePrivacy Art. 4.1a | Privacy | 156 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime) |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.aa | ePrivacy Arts. 4.1a, 4.1b | Privacy | 122 | IMCO + LIBE | -- | mix lawfulness with security allowing restrictions beyond security purposes |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.aa | ePrivacy Art. 4.1a | Privacy | 175 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime) |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3 | Security | 187 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | + | final revision of this amendment finally allows users to be notified about breaches of security concerning thier personal data, whatever NRAs or ISPs deem necessary |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3 | Security | 123 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3a | Security | 124 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3b | Security | 125 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3.1a | Security | 184 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | allows providers to abstain to notify users of a security breach concerning their private data |
| Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.4.1 | Security | 127 | IMCO + LIBE | 0 | implementing measures regarding security of personal data after consulting ENISA, EDPS, Art29 WP and stakeholders |
| Harbour Art 2.4b | ePrivacy Art. 6.6a | Privacy | 181 | PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE | + | narrows am130 as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller" |
| Harbour Art.2.4b | ePrivacy Art. 6.6a | Privacy | 130 | IMCO + LIBE | -- | allows processing of traffic data for broader purposes than pure security |
| Harbour Art. 2.6a | ePrivacy Art. 15.1 | Net Neutrality | 179 | PPE-DE | -- | extends restrictions to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (including IPR) |
| Harbour Art. 2.7a | ePrivacy Art. 18.1a | Privacy | 186 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | ++ | asks Commission for a report about use of IP addresses as personal data based on an in-depth study as suggested by EDPS |
| Harbour Annex I.B.bb | Universal Service Annex I.B.bb | Protection of childrens | 157=163=174 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL + Verts/ALE | ++ | fix am148 by replacing "control of access to unlawful content" by "prevention of access to unsuitable content" and by limiting use of traffic monitoring data to the user |
| Harbour Annex I.B.bb | Universal Service Annex I.B.bb | Protection of childrens | 148 part 1: "Member States shall ensure ... vulnerable people" | IMCO | - | still allows control of usages |
| " | " | " | 148 part 2: "to unlawful or dangerous content" | " | -- | allows control of unlawful usages |
| Harbour Rec. 12c | 3-strikes | 9 | IMCO | -- | fosters 3-strikes approach | |
| Harbour Rec. 12c | 3-strikes | 191 part1: Text as a whole excluding the words "this information ... personal data" | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | 0 | takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered | |
| " | " | 191 part 2: "this information ... personal data" | " | -- | still mentions relation to copyright infringement, unlawful uses and harmful content, contrary to EDPS advices | |
| Harbour Rec. 12c | 3-strikes | 169 | Verts/ALE | ++ | takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered and go further by deleting any suspicious wording | |
| Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 11 | IMCO | -- | notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package | |
| Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 170 | Verts/ALE | ++ | deletes "lawful" references of am11 and go further by putting first users' freedom | |
| Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 160 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | + | deletes "lawful" references of am11 | |
| Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 153 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | + | deletes "lawful" references of am11 | |
| Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 171 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access | |
| Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 154 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access | |
| Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 12 | IMCO | -- | allows restriction to particular types of content or applications | |
| Harbour Rec. 14b | Net Neutrality | 177 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "providers of electronic ... such decision" | ALDE | -- | "lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States" | |
| " | " | 177 part 2: "providers of electronic ... such decision" | " | -- | ISPs just cooperate | |
| Harbour Rec. 14b | Net Neutrality | 194 | PPE-DE + PSE | -- | "lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States", ISPs are not responsible | |
| Harbour Rec. 14c | RAND | 190 part 1: 'Text as a whole excluding the words "reasonable and" | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | 0 | no objection on this part | |
| " | " | 190 part 2: "reasonable and" | " | - | reference to any "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) wording should be avoided, since such fuzzyness allows unwanted solutions | |
| Harbour Rec. 14c | RAND | 13 | IMCO | - | proposes restrictions in direct contradictions with net neutrality | |
| Harbour Rec. 25 | 3-strikes | 192 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "Individual" and "furthermore, ... internet usage" | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | 0 | no objection on this part | |
| " | " | 192 part 2: "individual" | " | --- | allows systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage, using deceptive wording by preventing against "systematic surveillance of individual internet usage", this is contrary to EDPS opinion | |
| " | " | 192 part 3: "furthermore, ... internet usage" | " | + | "systematic surveillance of internet usage" is OK | |
| Harbour Rec. 26a | Privacy | 180 | PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE | + | illustrates the covered types of processing of personal data as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller" | |
| Harbour Rec. 27a | Privacy | 185 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | 0 | asks Commission for a study about use of IP addresses as personal data, but EDPS advice was more coercive | |
| Harbour Rec. 28 | Privacy | 182 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | -- | instead of focusing on safeguards of right to privacy and data protection as in Commission initial proposal, extends the safeguard to all fundamental rights, therefore including protection of IPR | |
| Harbour Rec. 29 | Security | 183 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | NRAs or "other competent national authority" have still to decide seriousness of breaches of security before alerting users | |
| Harbour Rec. 29 | Security | 33 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
