Translations:Directive Terrorisme/14/en

De La Quadrature du Net
Révision datée du 6 juin 2016 à 12:17 par Piks3l (discussion | contributions)
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On the other hand, the French example provides interesting insights on the blatant lack of transparency of the blocking procedure. The law only provides for the block as such. However, the French government has set up a redirection of requests for blocked pages towards a webpage hosted by the Ministry of the Interior, explaining the reasons for the block. As the Exégètes Amateurs state in their appeal to the Council of State against that measure, this "automated redirection of Internet users to a Ministry of the Interior webpage constitutes an infringement on freedom of communication and on secrecy of correspondence that is not provided for in the law, as well as a violation of the dispositions of the law of 6 January 1978 on Computing, files and liberties." Thus, the lack of a judiciary process to guarantee transparency and respect of fundamental liberties has allowed the Government to set up an opaque procedure that infringes on liberties.

  • The lack of transparency is blatant, as
    • neither the author, host or reader of the web page know what the charges are, what content is considered litigious on the blocked website, and none has any means to know the motivations for the block or the advancement of the procedure that led the administration to blocking the website
    • the list of blocked addresses is kept a secret and neither Internet users nor the persons directly concerned by the block are informed
    • the blocking procedure and the motives that may lead to blocking a website are nowhere specified.
  • The Government is setting up illegal processing of personal data among the data transmitted to it through the redirection, we find IP address [1], information about the web browser used (including the browser version and the operating system), the list of features and activated "add-ons", authentication cookies or session, etc. [2]
  • Should the IP address considered as personal data? This question has never been resolved and was referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the C-582/14 Breyer c. Bundesrepublik Deutschland case. The Advocate General concluded that the IP address is personal data, "to the extent that an ISP has additional information which, combined with the dynamic IP address, allows to identify the user". The Court will have to decide soon on this case.
  • For more information, read the reply sent to the French Council of State by Exegetes Amateurs in the appeal against the administrative blocking of websites.