Translations:Directive Terrorisme/14/en : Différence entre versions

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On the other hand, the French example provides interesting insights on the blattant lack of transparency of the blocking procedure. The law only provides for the block as such. However, the French government has set up a redirection of requests for blocked pages towards a webpage hosted by the Ministry of the Interior, explaining the reasons for the block. As the Exégètes Amateurs state in their appeal to the Council of State against that measure, this "automated redirection of Internet users to a Ministry of the Interior webpage constitutes an infringement on freedom of communication and on secrecy of correspondence that is not provided for in the law, as well as a violation of the dispositions of the law of 6 January 1978 on Computing, files and liberties." Thus, the lack of a judiciary process to guarantee transparency and respect of fundamental liberties has allowed the Government to set up an opaque procedure that infringes on liberties.
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On the other hand, the French example provides interesting insights on the blatant lack of transparency of the blocking procedure. The law only provides for the block as such. However, the French government has set up a redirection of requests for blocked pages towards a webpage hosted by the Ministry of the Interior, explaining the reasons for the block. As the Exégètes Amateurs state in their appeal to the Council of State against that measure, this "automated redirection of Internet users to a Ministry of the Interior webpage constitutes an infringement on freedom of communication and on secrecy of correspondence that is not provided for in the law, as well as a violation of the dispositions of the law of 6 January 1978 on Computing, files and liberties." Thus, the lack of a judiciary process to guarantee transparency and respect of fundamental liberties has allowed the Government to set up an opaque procedure that infringes on liberties.
 
* The lack of transparency is blatant, as
 
* The lack of transparency is blatant, as
 
** neither the author, host or reader of the web page know what the charges are, what content is considered litigious on the blocked website, and none has any means to know the motivations for the block or the advancement of the procedure that led the administration to blocking the website
 
** neither the author, host or reader of the web page know what the charges are, what content is considered litigious on the blocked website, and none has any means to know the motivations for the block or the advancement of the procedure that led the administration to blocking the website
 
** the list of blocked addresses is kept a secret and neither Internet users nor the persons directly concerned by the block are informed
 
** the list of blocked addresses is kept a secret and neither Internet users nor the persons directly concerned by the block are informed
 
** the blocking procedure and the motives that may lead to blocking a website are nowhere specified.
 
** the blocking procedure and the motives that may lead to blocking a website are nowhere specified.
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* The Goverment is setting up an illegal processing of personal data, since the data transmitted through the redirection notably comprises the IP address <ref>Should an IP address be considered a personal information? This question has never been definitely answered and was asked to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the case [http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=178241&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=810242 C-582/14 Breyer c. Bundesrepublik Deutschland].</ref>
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* The Government is setting up illegal processing of personal data among the data transmitted to it through the redirection, we find IP address <ref>Should the IP address considered as personal data? This question has never been resolved and was referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the [http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=178241&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=810242 C-582/14 Breyer c. Bundesrepublik Deutschland case]. The Advocate General concluded that the IP address is personal data, "''to the extent that an ISP has additional information which, combined with the dynamic IP address, allows to identify the user''". The Court will have to decide soon on this case.</ref>, information about the web browser used (including the browser version and the operating system), the list of features and activated "add-ons", authentication cookies or session, etc. <ref>For more information, read the [https://exegetes.eu.org/recours/filtragecazeneuve/CEtat/2015-10-24-replique.pdf reply] sent to the French Council of State by Exegetes Amateurs in the appeal against the administrative blocking of websites.</ref>

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Définition du message (Directive Terrorisme)
D'autre part, l'exemple français est intéressant à exposer, en particulier à propos du manque flagrant de transparence sur la procédure de blocage. La loi ne prévoit que le blocage ''stricto sensu''. Or le Gouvernement français a mis en place une redirection des requêtes faites par les internautes des pages bloquées vers une page hébergée par le ministère de l'Intérieur, expliquant les raisons du blocage. Or, comme le soulignent les «&nbsp;[https://exegetes.eu.org/about/ Exégètes amateurs]&nbsp;» dans leur [https://exegetes.eu.org/recours/filtragecazeneuve/CEtat/2015-10-24-replique.pdf recours au Conseil d'État], cette «&nbsp;''redirection automatique des internautes vers une page du ministère de l’Intérieur constitue une atteinte à la liberté de communication et au secret des correspondances non prévue par la loi ainsi qu’une violation des dispositions de la loi du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés''.&nbsp;» : l'absence de procédure judiciaire pour garantir la transparence et le respect des libertés fondamentales a permis au Gouvernement de mettre en place une procédure opaque et non respectueuse des libertés :
* L'absence de transparence est flagrante, dans la mesure où&nbsp;:
** ni l’auteur du site, ni son hébergeur, ni le lecteur de la page d’information ne savent ce qui est reproché  au contenu du site bloqué et ils ne peuvent en aucune manière connaître ni les motifs du blocage ni l’état de la procédure conduisant l’administration vers sa décision de blocage&nbsp;; 
** la liste des adresses bloquées est tenue secrète et ni les internautes ni les personnes directement concernée par le blocage ne sont informées&nbsp;;
** la procédure de blocage et les motivations pouvant conduire au blocage d'un site ne sont indiquées nulle part.
* Le Gouvernement met en place de façon illégale un traitement des données personnelles puisque parmi les données qui lui sont transmises via la redirection, on trouve notamment l'adresse IP<ref>L'adresse IP peut et doit-elle être considérée comme une donnée à caractère personnel ? Cette question n'a jamais encore été tranchée et a été posée à la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne dans le cadre de l'affaire [http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=178241&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=810242 C-582/14 Breyer c. Bundesrepublik Deutschland]. L'avocat général a conclu que l'adresse IP est une donnée à caractère personnel, «&nbsp;''dans la mesure où un fournisseur d’accès au réseau possède des informations supplémentaires qui, combinées à l’adresse IP dynamique, permettraient d’identifier l’utilisateur&nbsp'';». La Cour devra se prononcer bientôt.</ref>, des informations concernant le navigateur web utilisé (et notamment la version du navigateur et celle du système d'exploitation), la liste des fonctionnalités et «&nbsp;plugins&nbsp;» activés, les cookies d'authentification ou de session, etc.<ref>Pour plus d'informations, lire le [https://exegetes.eu.org/recours/filtragecazeneuve/CEtat/2015-10-24-replique.pdf mémoire en réplique] envoyé au Conseil d'État par Exégètes amateurs dans le cadre du recours contre le blocage administratif de sites.</ref>
TraductionOn the other hand, the French example provides interesting insights on the blatant lack of transparency of the blocking procedure. The law only provides for the block as such. However, the French government has set up a redirection of requests for blocked pages towards a webpage hosted by the Ministry of the Interior, explaining the reasons for the block. As the Exégètes Amateurs state in their appeal to the Council of State against that measure, this "automated redirection of Internet users to a Ministry of the Interior webpage constitutes an infringement on freedom of communication and on secrecy of correspondence that is not provided for in the law, as well as a violation of the dispositions of the law of 6 January 1978 on Computing, files and liberties." Thus, the lack of a judiciary process to guarantee transparency and respect of fundamental liberties has allowed the Government to set up an opaque procedure that infringes on liberties.
* The lack of transparency is blatant, as
** neither the author, host or reader of the web page know what the charges are, what content is considered litigious on the blocked website, and none has any means to know the motivations for the block or the advancement of the procedure that led the administration to blocking the website
** the list of blocked addresses is kept a secret and neither Internet users nor the persons directly concerned by the block are informed
** the blocking procedure and the motives that may lead to blocking a website are nowhere specified.
* The Government is setting up illegal processing of personal data among the data transmitted to it through the redirection, we find IP address <ref>Should the IP address considered as personal data? This question has never been resolved and was referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the [http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=178241&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=810242 C-582/14 Breyer c. Bundesrepublik Deutschland case]. The Advocate General concluded that the IP address is personal data, "''to the extent that an ISP has additional information which, combined with the dynamic IP address, allows to identify the user''". The Court will have to decide soon on this case.</ref>, information about the web browser used (including the browser version and the operating system), the list of features and activated "add-ons", authentication cookies or session, etc. <ref>For more information, read the [https://exegetes.eu.org/recours/filtragecazeneuve/CEtat/2015-10-24-replique.pdf reply] sent to the French Council of State by Exegetes Amateurs in the appeal against the administrative blocking of websites.</ref>

On the other hand, the French example provides interesting insights on the blatant lack of transparency of the blocking procedure. The law only provides for the block as such. However, the French government has set up a redirection of requests for blocked pages towards a webpage hosted by the Ministry of the Interior, explaining the reasons for the block. As the Exégètes Amateurs state in their appeal to the Council of State against that measure, this "automated redirection of Internet users to a Ministry of the Interior webpage constitutes an infringement on freedom of communication and on secrecy of correspondence that is not provided for in the law, as well as a violation of the dispositions of the law of 6 January 1978 on Computing, files and liberties." Thus, the lack of a judiciary process to guarantee transparency and respect of fundamental liberties has allowed the Government to set up an opaque procedure that infringes on liberties.

  • The lack of transparency is blatant, as
    • neither the author, host or reader of the web page know what the charges are, what content is considered litigious on the blocked website, and none has any means to know the motivations for the block or the advancement of the procedure that led the administration to blocking the website
    • the list of blocked addresses is kept a secret and neither Internet users nor the persons directly concerned by the block are informed
    • the blocking procedure and the motives that may lead to blocking a website are nowhere specified.
  • The Government is setting up illegal processing of personal data among the data transmitted to it through the redirection, we find IP address [1], information about the web browser used (including the browser version and the operating system), the list of features and activated "add-ons", authentication cookies or session, etc. [2]
  • ↑ Should the IP address considered as personal data? This question has never been resolved and was referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the C-582/14 Breyer c. Bundesrepublik Deutschland case. The Advocate General concluded that the IP address is personal data, "to the extent that an ISP has additional information which, combined with the dynamic IP address, allows to identify the user". The Court will have to decide soon on this case.
  • ↑ For more information, read the reply sent to the French Council of State by Exegetes Amateurs in the appeal against the administrative blocking of websites.
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