Telecoms Package Plenary Voting List

COD/2007/0247 - Trautmann report (networks and services)

Official voting list on EP website

Amending	Amended	Topic	Am. #	Source	Advice	Comment
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e	Framework Art. 8.4.g	Net Neutrality	61	ITRE	--	notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e	Framework Art. 8.4.g	Net Neutrality	130=142	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL	++	delete "lawful"
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e	Framework Art. 8.4.ga	Net Neutrality	131=143	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL	++	restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea	Framework Art. 8.4.ga	3-strikes	132=137	Toubon, Hieronymi and al. + PPE-DE	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach by "joint-industry solutions"
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea	Framework Art. 8.4.ga	Net Neutrality/Judicial Power	138	Bono, Cohn-Bendit, Roithová and al.	+++	restore judicial authority
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea	Framework Art. 8.4.g	Net Neutrality	139	Verts/ALE	++	restrictions subject to criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.9	Framework Art. 9	Net Neutrality	64	ITRE	--	"cultural and media policy objectives" opens door to filtering, stick to "promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity"
Trautmann Art. 1.24a	Framework Art. 25a	Technology Mandates / Internet Filtering	133	GUE/NGL	++	prevents Internet filtering
Trautmann Art. 2.6a	Authorisation Art. 9.1	Net Neutrality	98	ITRE	--	restrictions on access to services and applications endangers net neutrality
Trautmann Art. 2.8	Authorisation Art. 12	Net Neutrality	100	ITRE	--	obligations about "intellectual property rights" (paragraph 2, point e) is out-of-scope
Trautmann Art. 2.8.ba	Authorisation Art. 12.2	Net Neutrality	141	Verts/ALE	++	delete obligations about "intellectual property rights"
Trautmann Annex I.2.g	Access Annex I.A.19	Net Neutrality	120	ITRE	++	deletion is good, since relation with EUCD and IPRED is out-of-scope

COD/2007/0248 - Harbour report (network user's rights, privacy, consumer protection, ...)

Official voting list on EP website

Amending	Amended	Topic	Am. #	Source	Advice	Comment
Harbour Rec. 12c		3-strikes	169	Verts/ALE	++	takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered and go further by deleting any suspicious wording
Harbour Rec. 12c		3-strikes	191	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered but still mention relation to copyright infringement, unlawful uses and harmful content
Harbour Rec. 14		Net Neutrality	11	IMCO	--	notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package
Harbour Rec. 14		Net Neutrality	153=160	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL	+	deletes "lawful" references of am11
Harbour Rec. 14		Net Neutrality	170	Verts/ALE	++	deletes "lawful" references of am11 and go further by putting first users' freedom
Harbour Rec. 14a		Net Neutrality	12	IMCO	--	allows restriction to particular types of content or applications
Harbour Rec. 14a		Net Neutrality	154=171	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Rec. 14a		Net Neutrality	177	ALDE	--	"lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States", ISPs just cooperate
Harbour Rec. 14a		Net Neutrality	194	PPE-DE + PSE	--	"lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States", ISPs are not responsible
Harbour Rec. 14b		RAND	190	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	reference to any "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) wording should be avoided, since such fuzzyness allows unwanted solutions
Harbour Rec. 14c		DRM	14	IMCO	--	allows DRM imposed by NRAs approved by Commission
Harbour Rec. 25		3-strikes	192	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	---	allows systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage, using decepting wording by preventing against "systematic surveillance of individual internet usage", this is contrary to EDPS opinion
Harbour Rec. 26a		Privacy	180	PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE	+	illustrates the covered types of processing of personal data as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller"
Harbour Rec. 26b		Security	27	IMCO + LIBE	0	implementing measures regarding security of personal data after consulting ENISA, EDPS, Art29 WP and stakeholders
Harbour Rec. 26c		Privacy	28	IMCO + LIBE	0	reference to Data Protection Directive
Harbour Rec. 27a		Privacy	185	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	0	asks Commission for a study about use of IP addresses as personal data, but EDPS advice was more coercive
Harbour Rec. 28		Privacy	182	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	--	instead of focusing on safeguards of right to privacy and data protection as in Commission initial proposal, extends the safeguard to all fundamental rights, therefore including protection of IPR
Harbour Rec. 28a		Privacy	30	IMCO + LIBE	--	IP address as personal data
Harbour Rec. 29		Security	33	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Rec. 29		Security	183	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	NRAs or "other competent national authority" have still to decide seriousness of breaches of security before alerting users
Harbour Rec. 30a		Privacy	34	IMCO + LIBE	---	extends ePrivacy to Imaginary Property Rights (IPR)
Harbour Rec. 30b		Privacy	35	IMCO + LIBE	--	"fundamental rights" include protection of IPR
Harbour Art. 1.12	Universal Service Art. 20.2.1.b	Net Neutrality	62	IMCO	--	service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities
Harbour Art. 1.12	Universal Service Art. 20.2.2	3-strikes	67	IMCO	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.12	[Universal Service Art. 20.5	Net Neutrality	70	IMCO	++	rightfully delete a reference to lawfulness
Harbour Art. 1.12	[Universal Service Art. 20.6	Net Neutrality	71	IMCO	++	rightfully delete a reference to copyright
Harbour Art. 1.12	[Universal Service Art. 21.4	Net Neutrality	75	IMCO	--	allow restrictions based on lawfullness
Harbour Art. 1.12	[Universal Service Art. 21.4a	3-strikes	76	IMCO	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.13.b	[Universal Service Art. 22.3	DRM	193	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	even if references to "lawfullness" have been deleted since previous amendment 81, still opens doors to standardisation of DRM
Harbour Art. 1.13.b	[Universal Service Art. 22.3	DRM	155=172	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	rewords am193 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Art. 1.16	[Universal Service Art. 28.2a	Net Neutrality	101	IMCO	--	gives power to NRAs for requiring ISPs to impose restrictions
Harbour Art. 1.16	[Universal Service Art. 28.2a	Net Neutrality	173	Verts/ALE	++	limits restrictions to security and integrity
Harbour Art. 1.20	[Universal Service Art. 33.2a	3-strikes	112	IMCO	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.20	[Universal Service Art. 33.3	Interoperability	113	IMCO	-	weakens interoperability clause
Harbour Art. 1.21	[Universal Service Art. 34.1.2a	Judicial Power	117	IMCO	--	encourages out-of-courts procedures
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa	ePrivacy Arts. 4.1a, 4.1b	Privacy	122	IMCO + LIBE	--	mix lawfullness with security allowing restrictions beyond security purposes
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa	ePrivacy Art. 4.1a	Privacy	156=175	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime)
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3	Security	123	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3	Security	187	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	+	final revision of this amendment finally allows users to be notified about breaches of security concerning thier personal data, whatever NRAs or ISPs deem necessary
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3a	Security	124	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3b	Security	125	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3c	Security	126	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3.1a	Security	184	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	allows providers to abstain to notify users of a security breach concerning their private data
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.4.1	Security	127	IMCO + LIBE	0	implementing measures regarding security of personal data after consulting ENISA, EDPS, Art29 WP and stakeholders
Harbour Art.2.4b	ePrivacy Art. 6.6a	Privacy	130	IMCO + LIBE	--	allows processing of traffic data for broader purposes than pure security
Harbour Art 2.4b	ePrivacy Art. 6.6a	Privacy	181	PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE	+	narrows am130 as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller" f
Harbour Art. 2.5a	ePrivacy Art. 14.1	DRM	134	IMCO + LIBE	--	allows standardisation of DRM towards detection, interception and prevention of infringements of IPR
Harbour Art. 2.5b	ePrivacy Art. 14.3	Net Neutrality	135	IMCO + LIBE	+	adds a requirement to respect net neutrality
Harbour Art. 2.6a	ePrivacy Art. 15.1	Net Neutrality	179	PPE-DE	--	extends restrictions to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (including IPR)
Harbour Art. 2.7a	ePrivacy Art. 18.1a	Privacy	186	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	++	asks Commission for a report about use of IP addresses as personal data based on an in-depth study as suggested by EDPS
Harbour Annex I.B.bb	[Universal Service Annex I.B.bb	Protection of childrens	148	IMCO	--	allows control of unlawful usages
Harbour Annex I.B.bb	[Universal Service Annex I.B.bb	Protection of childrens	157=163=174	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL + Verts/ALE	++	fix am148 by replacing "control of access to unlawful content" by "prevention of access to unsuitable content" and by limiting use of traffic monitoring data to the user