Telecoms Package Plenary Voting List

The following tables present a voting list with some comments only about amendment raising concerns for La Quadrature du Net. The printable (PDF) files give voting lists with all amendments put to vote, as shown in European Parliament's voting list format.

• Voting list on Trautmann report FINAL PRINTABLE VERSION
• Voting list on Harbour report FINAL PRINTABLE VERSION

COD/2007/0247 - Trautmann report (networks and services)

• FINAL PRINTABLE VERSION
• Official voting list on EP website

Amending	Amended	Topic	Am. #	Source	Advice	Comment
Trautmann Art. 2.6a	Access Art. 9.1	Net Neutrality	98 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "restrictions ... policies"	ITRE	0	no objections on this part
"	"	"	98 part 2: "restrictions ... policies"	"	--	restrictions on access to services and applications endangers net neutrality
Trautmann Art. 2.8	Access Art. 12	Net Neutrality	100 part 1: Everything except paragraph 2e)	ITRE	+	no objections on this part, and even some good support for interoperability
"	"	"	100 part 2: paragraph 2e)	"	--	obligations about "intellectual property rights" (paragraph 2, point e) is out-of-scope
Trautmann Annex I.2.g	Authorisation Annex I.A.19	Net Neutrality	120	ITRE	++	deletion is good, since relation with EUCD and IPRED is out-of-scope
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea	Framework Art. 8.4.g	Net Neutrality	139	Verts/ALE	++	restrictions subject to criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e	Framework Art. 8.4.g	Net Neutrality	130=142	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL	++	delete "lawful"
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e	Framework Art. 8.4.g	Net Neutrality	61 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "and for this purpose ... lawful content"	ITRE	-	can still be dangerous with reference to Universal Service directive if amendment 112 Harbour is voted
"	"	"	61 part2: "and for this purpose ... lawful content"	"	--	notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea	Framework Art. 8.4.ga	3-strikes	132 part 1: "(ea) In paragraph 4 ... creative content industries"	Toubon, Hieronymi and al.	-	as EDPS has recommended, cooperation between ISP and copyright industry can be good if completed by an amendment to clarify that it should not allow for systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage
"	"	"	132 part 2: in order to foster ... codes of conduct"	"	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach by "joint-industry solutions"
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea	Framework Art. 8.4.ga	Net Neutrality/Judicial Power	138 part 1: "applying the principle ... judicial authorities" excluding "notably in accordance ... expression and information"	Bono, Cohn-Bendit, Roithová and al.	+++	restore judicial authority
"	"	"	138 part 2: "notably in accordance ... expression and information"	"	+	restore judicial authority with reference to ECHR
"	"	"	138 part 3: "except where ... public morality"	"	++	restore judicial authority with exceptions imposed by subsidiarity principle
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e	Framework Art. 8.4.ga	Net Neutrality	131	IND/DEM	++	restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e	Framework Art. 8.4.ga	Net Neutrality	143	GUE/NGL	++	restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.9	Framework Art. 9	Net Neutrality	64	ITRE	--	"cultural and media policy objectives" opens door to filtering, stick to "promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity"
Trautmann Art. 1.24a	Framework Art. 25a	Technology Mandates / Internet Filtering	133	GUE/NGL	++	prevents Internet filtering
Trautmann Art. 2.8.ba	Access Art. 12.2	Net Neutrality	141	Verts/ALE	++	delete obligations about "intellectual property rights"

COD/2007/0248 - Harbour report (network user's rights, privacy, consumer protection, ...)

• FINAL PRINTABLE VERSION
• Official voting list on EP website

Remark: as you can see on this screenshot (taken on Sep. 23 2008, 14:09), amendments 158 and 166 to Harbour report are not accessible on the European Parliament website, although they are included on the official voting list published by tabling office. We have managed to get a paper copy of amendment 166 and recommend to support it, but content of amendment 158 is still unknown, therefore we advise to reject it by precautionary principle. Update 17:41: both amendments have now been published, it is about security and introduce DRM to render personal data unintelligible,in the event of accidental or unlawful destruction, loss or alteration or unauthorized disclosure of or access to personal data. We still recommend to vote against amendment 158, and for amendment 166.

Amending	Amended	Topic	Am. #	Source	Advice	Comment
Harbour Rec. 14d		DRM	14 part1: "Since inconsistent ... across the Community"	IMCO	-	can be dangerous wrt DRM (as part 2) by allowing "other measures"
"		"	14 part2: "and, if necessary ... Community"	"	--	allows DRM imposed by NRAs approved by Commission
Harbour Rec. 28a		Privacy	30 part 1: "For the purpose ... with other data"	IMCO + LIBE	--	IP address as personal data
"		"	30 part2: "within two years ... supervisors"	"	--	IP address as personal data in Community legislation
Harbour Rec. 30a		Privacy	34	IMCO + LIBE	---	extends ePrivacy to IPR
Harbour Rec. 30b		Privacy	35	IMCO + LIBE	--	"fundamental rights" include protection of IPR
Harbour Art. 1.12	Universal Service Art. 20.2.1.b	Net Neutrality	62 part1: "services provided ... territory"	IMCO	0	no objections on this part
"	"	"	62 part2: "information on ... and services"	"	--	service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities
"	"	"	62 part3: "the service quality ... initial connection"	"	0	no objections on this part
"	"	"	62 part4: "and any ... provider"	"	--	service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities
Harbour Art. 1.12	Universal Service Art. 20.2.2	3-strikes	67 part 1: "The contract shall ... networks and services"	IMCO	0	no objection on this part
"	"	"	67 part 2: "to engage ... provided"	"	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.12	Universal Service Art. 21.4	Net Neutrality	75 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "inform subscribers ... of their choice" [sub c)]	IMCO	0	no objection on this part
"	"	"	75 part 2: "inform subscribers ... of their choice" [sub c)]	"	--	allows restrictions based on lawfulness
Harbour Art. 1.12	Universal Service Art. 21.4a	3-strikes	76 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "the common uses ... their consequences; and" [point a)]	IMCO	0	no objection on this part
"	"	"	76 part 2: "the common uses ... their consequences; and" [point a)]	"	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.20	Universal Service Art. 33.2a	3-strikes	112	IMCO	--	opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.20	Universal Service Art. 33.3	Interoperability	113	IMCO	-	weakens interoperability clause
Harbour Art. 1.21	Universal Service Art. 34.1.2a	Judicial Power	117	IMCO	--	encourages out-of-courts procedures
Harbour Art. 2.5a	ePrivacy Art. 14.1	DRM	134 part 1: "in implementing ...technical features"	IMCO + LIBE	+	goes back to current inital version of ePrivacy directive
"	"	"	134 part 2: "including ... rights by users"	"	--	allows standardisation of DRM for purposes of detecting, intercepting, or preventing infringements of IPR
"	"	"	134 part 3: "are imposed ... Member States"	"	+	goes back to current inital version of ePrivacy directive
Harbour Art. 1.13.b	Universal Service Art. 22.3	DRM	155=172	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	rewords am193 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Art. 1.13.b	Universal Service Art. 22.3	DRM	193	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	even if references to "lawfulness" have been deleted since previous amendment 81, still opens doors to standardisation of DRM
Harbour Art. 1.13.b	Universal Service Art. 22.3	DRM	81 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the word "lawful" (twice)	IMCO	0	no objection on this part
"	"	"	81 part 2: "lawful" (twice)	"	--	opens doors to standardisation of DRM
Harbour Art. 1.16	Universal Service Art. 28.2a	Net Neutrality	173	Verts/ALE	++	limits restrictions to security and integrity
Harbour Art. 1.16	Universal Service Art. 28.2a	Net Neutrality	101	IMCO	--	gives power to NRAs for requiring ISPs to impose restrictions
Harbour Art. 1.19a	Universal Service Art. 32a	3-strikes	166	GUE/NGL	++	garantees access to content, services and application
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa	ePrivacy Art. 4.1a	Privacy	156	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime)
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa	ePrivacy Arts. 4.1a, 4.1b	Privacy	122	IMCO + LIBE	--	mix lawfulness with security allowing restrictions beyond security purposes
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa	ePrivacy Art. 4.1a	Privacy	175	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime)
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3	Security	187	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	+	final revision of this amendment finally allows users to be notified about breaches of security concerning thier personal data, whatever NRAs or ISPs deem necessary
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3	Security	123	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3a	Security	124	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3b	Security	125	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.3.1a	Security	184	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	allows providers to abstain to notify users of a security breach concerning their private data
Harbour Art. 2.3.b	ePrivacy Art. 4.4.1	Security	127	IMCO + LIBE	0	implementing measures regarding security of personal data after consulting ENISA, EDPS, Art29 WP and stakeholders
Harbour Art 2.4b	ePrivacy Art. 6.6a	Privacy	181	PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE	+	narrows am130 as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller"
Harbour Art.2.4b	ePrivacy Art. 6.6a	Privacy	130	IMCO + LIBE	--	allows processing of traffic data for broader purposes than pure security
Harbour Art. 2.6a	ePrivacy Art. 15.1	Net Neutrality	179	PPE-DE	--	extends restrictions to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (including IPR)
Harbour Art. 2.7a	ePrivacy Art. 18.1a	Privacy	186	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	++	asks Commission for a report about use of IP addresses as personal data based on an in-depth study as suggested by EDPS
Harbour Annex I.B.bb	Universal Service Annex I.B.bb	Protection of childrens	157=163=174	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL + Verts/ALE	++	fix am148 by replacing "control of access to unlawful content" by "prevention of access to unsuitable content" and by limiting use of traffic monitoring data to the user
Harbour Annex I.B.bb	Universal Service Annex I.B.bb	Protection of childrens	148 part 1: "Member States shall ensure ... vulnerable people"	IMCO	-	still allows control of usages
"	"	"	148 part 2: "to unlawful or dangerous content"	"	--	allows control of unlawful usages
Harbour Rec. 12c		3-strikes	9	IMCO	--	fosters 3-strikes approach
Harbour Rec. 12c		3-strikes	191 part1: Text as a whole excluding the words "this information ... personal data"	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	0	takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered
"		"	191 part 2: "this information ... personal data"	"	--	still mentions relation to copyright infringement, unlawful uses and harmful content, contrary to EDPS advices
Harbour Rec. 12c		3-strikes	169	Verts/ALE	++	takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered and go further by deleting any suspicious wording
Harbour Rec. 14		Net Neutrality	11	IMCO	--	notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package
Harbour Rec. 14		Net Neutrality	170	Verts/ALE	++	deletes "lawful" references of am11 and go further by putting first users' freedom
Harbour Rec. 14		Net Neutrality	160	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL	+	deletes "lawful" references of am11
Harbour Rec. 14		Net Neutrality	153	IND/DEM + GUE/NGL	+	deletes "lawful" references of am11
Harbour Rec. 14a		Net Neutrality	171	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Rec. 14a		Net Neutrality	154	IND/DEM + Verts/ALE	++	rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Rec. 14a		Net Neutrality	12	IMCO	--	allows restriction to particular types of content or applications
Harbour Rec. 14b		Net Neutrality	177 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "providers of electronic ... such decision"	ALDE	--	"lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States"
"		"	177 part 2: "providers of electronic ... such decision"	"	--	ISPs just cooperate
Harbour Rec. 14b		Net Neutrality	194	PPE-DE + PSE	--	"lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States", ISPs are not responsible
Harbour Rec. 14c		RAND	190 part 1: 'Text as a whole excluding the words "reasonable and"	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	0	no objection on this part
"		"	190 part 2: "reasonable and"	"	-	reference to any "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) wording should be avoided, since such fuzzyness allows unwanted solutions
Harbour Rec. 14c		RAND	13	IMCO	-	proposes restrictions in direct contradictions with net neutrality
Harbour Rec. 25		3-strikes	192 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "Individual" and "furthermore, ... internet usage"	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	0	no objection on this part
"		"	192 part 2: "individual"	"	---	allows systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage, using deceptive wording by preventing against "systematic surveillance of individual internet usage", this is contrary to EDPS opinion
"		"	192 part 3: "furthermore, ... internet usage"	"	+	"systematic surveillance of internet usage" is OK
Harbour Rec. 26a		Privacy	180	PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE	+	illustrates the covered types of processing of personal data as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller"
Harbour Rec. 27a		Privacy	185	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	0	asks Commission for a study about use of IP addresses as personal data, but EDPS advice was more coercive
Harbour Rec. 28		Privacy	182	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	--	instead of focusing on safeguards of right to privacy and data protection as in Commission initial proposal, extends the safeguard to all fundamental rights, therefore including protection of IPR
Harbour Rec. 29		Security	183	ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE	-	NRAs or "other competent national authority" have still to decide seriousness of breaches of security before alerting users
Harbour Rec. 29		Security	33	IMCO + LIBE	-	breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so