Telecoms Package Plenary Voting List : Différence entre versions
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! Amending !! Amended !! Topic !! Am. # !! Source !! Advice !! Comment | ! Amending !! Amended !! Topic !! Am. # !! Source !! Advice !! Comment | ||
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− | | '''Vote "en bloc" of ITRE amendments'''<br />[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0697:FIN:EN:HTML Trautmann] Arts. 2.6a, 2.8, Annex I. | + | | '''Vote "en bloc" of ITRE amendments'''<br />[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0697:FIN:EN:HTML Trautmann] Arts. 2.6a, 2.8, Annex I.3.g || [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0019:EN:HTML Authorisation] Arts. 9.1, 12, Annex I.A.19 || [[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments_by_Topic#Amendments_Threatening_Net_Neutrality|Net Neutrality]] || '''"en bloc": 1-60, 62-63, 65, 67-69, 71-125'''<br />[[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments#Amendment_98_--|98]]<br />[[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments#Amendment_100_--|100]]<br />[[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments#Amendment_120_++|120]] || [[MEPs_ITRE|ITRE]] ||style="background:#FF6B6B"| '''"en bloc": --'''<br />98: --<br />100: --<br />120: ++ || '''"en bloc": too many loopholes if there are no split votes to fix them'''<br />98: restrictions on access to services and applications endangers net neutrality<br />100: obligations about "intellectual property rights" (paragraph 2, point e) is out-of-scope<br />120: deletion is good, since relation with EUCD and IPRED is out-of-scope |
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| [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0697:FIN:EN:HTML Trautmann] Art. 1.8.ea || [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0021:EN:HTML Framework] Art. 8.4.g || [[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments_by_Topic#Amendments_Threatening_Net_Neutrality|Net Neutrality]] || [[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments#Amendment_139_++|139]] || [[MEPs_Verts|Verts/ALE]] ||style="background:#A4FFA4"| ++ || restrictions subject to criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality | | [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0697:FIN:EN:HTML Trautmann] Art. 1.8.ea || [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0021:EN:HTML Framework] Art. 8.4.g || [[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments_by_Topic#Amendments_Threatening_Net_Neutrality|Net Neutrality]] || [[Telecoms_Package_Plenary_Amendments#Amendment_139_++|139]] || [[MEPs_Verts|Verts/ALE]] ||style="background:#A4FFA4"| ++ || restrictions subject to criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality |
Version du 22 septembre 2008 à 10:46
COD/2007/0247 - Trautmann report (networks and services)
Official voting list on EP website
Amending | Amended | Topic | Am. # | Source | Advice | Comment |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Vote "en bloc" of ITRE amendments Trautmann Arts. 2.6a, 2.8, Annex I.3.g |
Authorisation Arts. 9.1, 12, Annex I.A.19 | Net Neutrality | "en bloc": 1-60, 62-63, 65, 67-69, 71-125 98 100 120 |
ITRE | "en bloc": -- 98: -- 100: -- 120: ++ |
"en bloc": too many loopholes if there are no split votes to fix them 98: restrictions on access to services and applications endangers net neutrality 100: obligations about "intellectual property rights" (paragraph 2, point e) is out-of-scope 120: deletion is good, since relation with EUCD and IPRED is out-of-scope |
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea | Framework Art. 8.4.g | Net Neutrality | 139 | Verts/ALE | ++ | restrictions subject to criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality |
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.g | Net Neutrality | 130=142 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | ++ | delete "lawful" |
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.g | Net Neutrality | 61 | ITRE | -- | notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package |
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | 3-strikes | 132=137 | Toubon, Hieronymi and al. + PPE-DE | -- | opens door to 3-strikes approach by "joint-industry solutions" |
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | Net Neutrality/Judicial Power | 138 | Bono, Cohn-Bendit, Roithová and al. | +++ | restore judicial authority |
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | Net Neutrality | 131 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | ++ | restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality |
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e | Framework Art. 8.4.ga | Net Neutrality | 143 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | ++ | restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality |
Harbour Art. 2.5a | ePrivacy Art. 14.1 | DRM | 134 | IMCO + LIBE | -- | allows standardisation of DRM towards detection, interception and prevention of infringements of IPR |
Trautmann Art. 1.9 | Framework Art. 9 | Net Neutrality | 64 | ITRE | -- | "cultural and media policy objectives" opens door to filtering, stick to "promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity" |
Harbour Art. 2.5b | ePrivacy Art. 14.3 | Net Neutrality | 135 | IMCO + LIBE | + | adds a requirement to respect net neutrality |
Harbour Art. 1.12 | [Universal Service Art. 20.5 | Net Neutrality | 70 | IMCO | ++ | rightfully delete a reference to lawfulness |
Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3c | Security | 126 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
Trautmann Art. 1.24a | Framework Art. 25a | Technology Mandates / Internet Filtering | 133 | GUE/NGL | ++ | prevents Internet filtering |
Trautmann Art. 2.8.ba | Authorisation Art. 12.2 | Net Neutrality | 141 | Verts/ALE | ++ | delete obligations about "intellectual property rights" |
COD/2007/0248 - Harbour report (network user's rights, privacy, consumer protection, ...)
Official voting list on EP website
Amending | Amended | Topic | Am. # | Source | Advice | Comment |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Vote "en bloc" of ITRE amendments Harbour Recs. 14c, 26b, 26c, 28a, 29, 30a, 30b, Arts. 1.12, 1.20, 1.21 |
Universal Service Arts. 20.2.1.b, 20.2.2, 20.6, 21.4, 21.4a, 33.2a, 33.3, 34.1.2a | DRM Security Privacy Net Neutrality 3-strikes Interoperability Judicial Power |
"en bloc": 1-8, 10, 14-73, 75-78, 80, 82-89, 91-93, 95-100, 102-121, 128-129, 131-147, 149-152 14 27 28 30 33 34 35 62 67 71 75 76 112 113 117 |
IMCO | "en bloc": --- 14: -- 27: 0 28: 0 30: -- 33: - 34: --- 35: -- 62: -- 67: -- 71: ++ 75: -- 76: -- 112: -- 113: - 117: -- |
"en bloc": too many loopholes if there are no split votes to fix them 14: allows DRM imposed by NRAs approved by Commission 27: implementing measures regarding security of personal data after consulting ENISA, EDPS, Art29 WP and stakeholders 28: reference to Data Protection Directive 30: IP address as personal data 33: breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so extends ePrivacy to Imaginary Property Rights (IPR) "fundamental rights" include protection of IPR 62: service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities 67: opens door to 3-strikes approach 71: rightfully delete a reference to copyright 75: allow restrictions based on lawfullness 76: opens door to 3-strikes approach 112: opens door to 3-strikes approach 113: weakens interoperability clause 117: encourages out-of-courts procedures |
Harbour Art. 1.13.b | [Universal Service Art. 22.3 | DRM | 155=172 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | rewords am193 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access |
Harbour Art. 1.13.b | [Universal Service Art. 22.3 | DRM | 193 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | even if references to "lawfullness" have been deleted since previous amendment 81, still opens doors to standardisation of DRM |
Harbour Art. 1.16 | [Universal Service Art. 28.2a | Net Neutrality | 173 | Verts/ALE | ++ | limits restrictions to security and integrity |
Harbour Art. 1.16 | [Universal Service Art. 28.2a | Net Neutrality | 101 | IMCO | -- | gives power to NRAs for requiring ISPs to impose restrictions |
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa | ePrivacy Art. 4.1a | Privacy | 156 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime) |
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa | ePrivacy Arts. 4.1a, 4.1b | Privacy | 122 | IMCO + LIBE | -- | mix lawfullness with security allowing restrictions beyond security purposes |
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa | ePrivacy Art. 4.1a | Privacy | 175 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime) |
Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3 | Security | 187 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | + | final revision of this amendment finally allows users to be notified about breaches of security concerning thier personal data, whatever NRAs or ISPs deem necessary |
Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3 | Security | 123 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3a | Security | 124 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3b | Security | 125 | IMCO + LIBE | - | breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so |
Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.3.1a | Security | 184 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | allows providers to abstain to notify users of a security breach concerning their private data |
Harbour Art. 2.3.b | ePrivacy Art. 4.4.1 | Security | 127 | IMCO + LIBE | 0 | implementing measures regarding security of personal data after consulting ENISA, EDPS, Art29 WP and stakeholders |
Harbour Art 2.4b | ePrivacy Art. 6.6a | Privacy | 181 | PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE | + | narrows am130 as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller" |
Harbour Art.2.4b | ePrivacy Art. 6.6a | Privacy | 130 | IMCO + LIBE | -- | allows processing of traffic data for broader purposes than pure security |
Harbour Art. 2.6a | ePrivacy Art. 15.1 | Net Neutrality | 179 | PPE-DE | -- | extends restrictions to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (including IPR) |
Harbour Art. 2.7a | ePrivacy Art. 18.1a | Privacy | 186 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | ++ | asks Commission for a report about use of IP addresses as personal data based on an in-depth study as suggested by EDPS |
Harbour Annex I.B.bb | [Universal Service Annex I.B.bb | Protection of childrens | 157=163=174 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL + Verts/ALE | ++ | fix am148 by replacing "control of access to unlawful content" by "prevention of access to unsuitable content" and by limiting use of traffic monitoring data to the user |
Harbour Annex I.B.bb | [Universal Service Annex I.B.bb | Protection of childrens | 148 | IMCO | -- | allows control of unlawful usages |
Harbour Rec. 12c | 3-strikes | 191 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered but still mention relation to copyright infringement, unlawful uses and harmful content | |
Harbour Rec. 12c | 3-strikes | 169 | Verts/ALE | ++ | takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered and go further by deleting any suspicious wording | |
Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 11 | IMCO | -- | notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package | |
Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 170 | Verts/ALE | ++ | deletes "lawful" references of am11 and go further by putting first users' freedom | |
Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 160 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | + | deletes "lawful" references of am11 | |
Harbour Rec. 14 | Net Neutrality | 153 | IND/DEM + GUE/NGL | + | deletes "lawful" references of am11 | |
Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 171 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access | |
Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 154 | IND/DEM + Verts/ALE | ++ | rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access | |
Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 12 | IMCO | -- | allows restriction to particular types of content or applications | |
Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 177 | ALDE | -- | "lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States", ISPs just cooperate | |
Harbour Rec. 14a | Net Neutrality | 194 | PPE-DE + PSE | -- | "lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States", ISPs are not responsible | |
Harbour Rec. 14b | RAND | 190 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | reference to any "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) wording should be avoided, since such fuzzyness allows unwanted solutions | |
Harbour Rec. 25 | 3-strikes | 192 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | --- | allows systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage, using decepting wording by preventing against "systematic surveillance of individual internet usage", this is contrary to EDPS opinion | |
Harbour Rec. 26a | Privacy | 180 | PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE | + | illustrates the covered types of processing of personal data as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller" | |
Harbour Rec. 27a | Privacy | 185 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | 0 | asks Commission for a study about use of IP addresses as personal data, but EDPS advice was more coercive | |
Harbour Rec. 28 | Privacy | 182 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | -- | instead of focusing on safeguards of right to privacy and data protection as in Commission initial proposal, extends the safeguard to all fundamental rights, therefore including protection of IPR | |
Harbour Rec. 29 | Security | 183 | ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE | - | NRAs or "other competent national authority" have still to decide seriousness of breaches of security before alerting users |