Snowden revelations impact Canada

Canada

Snowden’s revelations have implicated Canada’s foreign intelligence signals agency -- the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) -- in expansive domestic and foreign surveillance initiatives. To date, however, the Snowden effect has led to few tangible or significant reforms designed to remedy problematic surveillance practices exposed by the Snowden revelations. The most significant responses have included civil society and media commentary, some parliamentary action in the form of criticism, fact-finding activities and reform efforts, and early judicial and quasi-judicial interventions. These collective efforts have dovetailed with (and enhanced) previous efforts at reform of Canada’s foreign intelligence and domestic surveillance regime. While the net result has led to a greater understanding of CSEC’s activities and objectives, there has been minimal concrete movement towards reform aside from some early judicial proceedings.

Les révélations de Snowden ont impliqué les agences du renseignement numérique du Canada -- le Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada (CSTC en français, CSEC en anglais) -- dans les travaux de surveillance étrangère et intérieure. Aujourd’hui toutefois, l’effet Snowden n’a mené à des réformes peu tangibles ou significatives en réponse aux pratiques de surveillance rendues publiques par les révélations de Snowden. Les réponses les plus significatives comprennent celles de la société civile et des commentaires des médias, quelques actions parlementaires sous forme de critique, d’activités de vérification des faits et d’efforts de réformes, ainsi que des premières interventions judiciaires ou pseudo-judiciaires. Ces efforts collectifs se sont emboîtés avec (et ont amélioré) les efforts précédents de réforme du régime de surveillance intérieure et de renseignement étranger du Canada. Bien que le résultat net ait mené à une meilleure compréhension des activités et objectifs du CSTC, il y a un mouvement concret minimal vers une réforme à part les quelques premières procédures judiciaires.:

Canadian media have received and published several Snowden documents implicating CSEC. These publications have been supplemented by domestic investigative media efforts. CSEC has been controversially implicated in surveillance of the Brazilian Ministry which grants resource exploitation contracts, [1] in undermining of international security standards, [2] in aiding five eyes partners to spy on political allies during G8 and G20 meetings, [3] and in using CSEC’s metadata reserves to map individual movements and infrastructure in Canada by monitoring public wifi networks. [4] Canadian media has also documented the dramatic growth in CSEC’s budget in recent years, as well as its close financial links to foreign agencies such as the U.S. National Security Agency. [5] General concern over CSEC has led to calls for reform of Canada’s foreign intelligence surveillance apparatus by a number of major Canadian newspapers. [6] It should be noted that while the media response has been significant by historical standards, it has largely remained driven by Canadian-specific revelations.

Les médias canadiens ont reçu et publié plusieurs documents de Snowden impliquant le CSTC. Ces publications ont été complétées par des efforts de médias d’investigation du pays. Le CSTC a été impliqué de façon controversée dans la surveillance du ministère brésilien qui accorde les contrats d’exploitation des ressources, [1] dans la sape de standards internationaux de sécurité, [2] dans l’aide aux partenaires des Five Eyes pour espionner les alliés politiques au cours des rencontres du G8 et du G20, [3] et dans l’utilisation des réserves de métadonnées du CSTC pour cartographier les mouvements des individus et des infrastructures du Canada en surveillant les réseaux wifi publics. [4] Les médias canadiens ont aussi documenté la croissance dramatique du budget du CSTC ces dernières années, ainsi que ses liens financiers proches d’agences étrangères telles que la National Security Agency des États-Unis. [5] Une inquiétude générale à propos du CSTC a mené à des appels à la réforme de l’appareil de surveillance du renseignement étranger du Canada par un nombre important de grands journaux canadiens. [6] Il faut noter que bien que la réponse médiatique ait été significative par rapport aux standards historiques, elle est restée largement focalisée sur les révélations spécifiques au Canada.:

In response to the Snowden disclosures, Canadian civil society and academics have worked to raise awareness of state surveillance. This has included education campaigns and online actions. Notably, the Protect Our Privacy Coalition - comprised of over 50 major organizations and two-dozen leading academics - launched an online action calling on Members of Parliament to rein in CSEC's more intrusive activities as part of an internatoinal day of action. [7] Academics have convened workshops and high profile debates, [8] and publicly explained the significance of state surveillance online and through media. One workshop launched a book on surveillance in Canada [9] and generated the Ottawa Statement on Mass Surveillance. [10] Additional efforts from researchers at the University of Toronto have tried to ascertain how long Internet service providers collect, retain, and handle subscriber data, as well as data routing practices, [11] and to pressure telecommunications companies into improving their transparency regarding disclosure of customer data to state agencies. [12] These efforts have only recently begun yielding some responses from private telecommunications companies in the form of transparency reports, [13] but no commitment to change from the federal government or from CSEC.

En réponse aux révélations de Snowden, la société civile et académique canadienne a travaillé pour faire prendre conscience de la surveillance étatique. Cela s’est manifesté par des campagnes d’éducation et des actions en ligne. Notablement, la Protect Our Privacy Coalition (Coalition Protégez notre vie privée) – comprenant plus de 50 grandes organisations et deux dizaines d’universitaires majeurs – a lancé une action en ligne appelant les membres du Parlement à contrôler les activités les plus intrusives du CSTC lors de la journée d’action internationale. [7] Des universitaires ont tenu des ateliers et des débats de grande qualité, [8] et ont expliqué publiquement l’importance de la surveillance étatique en ligne et au travers des médias. Un atelier a lancé un livre sur la surveillance au Canada [9] et a écrit la Déclaration d’Ottawa sur la surveillance de masse. [10] D’autres efforts d’universitaires de l’université de Toronto ont cherché à découvrir pendant combien de temps les fournisseurs d’accès Internet ont collecté, conservé et traité les données des usagers, ainsi que les pratiques de routage des données, [11] et à faire pression sur les entreprises de télécommunication pour qu’elles améliorent leur transparence vis-à-vis de la divulgation des données des usagers aux agences gouvernementales. [12] Ces efforts n’ont que récemment donné quelques réponses venant des entreprises privées de télécommunication sous la forme de rapports de transparence, [12] mais il n’y a pas eu d’engagement de la part du gouvernement fédéral ou du CSTC.:

Canada’s legislative bodies have also been active. The Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence is studying CSEC’s activities [14] and may produce a report with recommendations for reform. Opposition parties in Canada’s primary legislative body -- the House of Commons -- have called for an emergency debate on CSEC’s surveillance activities [15] and for the government to commit to transparency and reform of CSEC. [16] Opposition MP Charmaine Borg attempted to force the disclosure of statistics concerning the scope of government’s agencies’ surveillance efforts (including CSEC’s) and met with limited response from domestic agencies and none from CSEC. [17] Finally, two bills have been introduced by individual MPs to enhance oversight of CSEC’s activities; [18] unfortunately, neither has the government’s support nor do they include amendments to CSEC’s substantive legal or operational framework.

Les corps législatifs du Canada ont aussi été actifs. Le Comité permanent du Sénat sur la sécurité et la défense nationale étudie les activités du CSTC [14] et pourrait produire un rapport avec des recommendations pour une réforme. Les partis d’opposition dans le corps principal législatif du Canade -- la Chambre des communes -- ont appelé à un débat d’urgence sur les activités de surveillance du CSTC. [16] La membre du parlement dans l’opposition Charmaine Borg a tenté de forcer la divulgation de statistiques sur l’étendue des efforts de surveillance des agences gouvernementales (dont la CSTC) mais n’a eu qu’une réponse limitée des agences intérieures et aucune du CSTC. [17] Finalement, deux projets de loi ont été introduit par des membres du parlement pour étendre la supervision des activités du CSTC ; [18] malheureusement, ça n’a pas eu le soutien du gouvernement et ils n’ont pas non plus inclu d’amendements sur les contextes légaux et opérationels du CSTC.:

The most promising developments in Canada have arisen from judicial and quasi-judicial initiatives. First, Justice Mosley of the Federal Court reconsidered, on his own initiative, a surveillance authorization decision he had issued in 2009. The authorization let the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service intercept, with CSEC’s assistance, the communications of two Canadians travelling abroad as long as the communications transited through Canada. [19] In late 2013, Justice Mosley issued a strong rebuke to CSEC and CSIS for strategically omitting critical information in their 2009 warrant application relating to CSEC’s use of its significant and expansive Five Eyes resources in support of the authorized interceptions. [20] As a result of this decision (which will be appealed) CSEC cannot use its Five Eyes resources when assisting domestic agencies with their surveillance activities.

Les développements les plus prometteurs au Canada sont venus des initiatives judiciaires et quasi-judiciaires. Premièrement, le juge Mosley de la cour fédérale a reconsidéré, de sa propre initiative, une décision d’autorisation de surveillance qu’il avait délivrée en 2009. L’autorisation laissait le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité intercepter, avec l’aide du CSTC, les communications de deux Canadiens en voyage à l’étranger tant que les communications transitaient par le Canada. [19] Fin 2013, le juge Mosley a délivré une forte réprimande au CSTC et au SCRS (CSIS en anglais) pour avoir omis stratégiquement des informations critiques dans leur demande de mandat de 2009 en lien avec l’utilisation par le CSTC de ses ressources importantes et croissantes du Five Eyes en soutien aux interceptions autorisées. [20] En résultat de cette décision (à laquelle il sera fait appel), le CSTC ne peut pas utiliser ses ressources du Five Eyes lorsqu’il assiste les agences intérieures avec ses activités de surveillance.:

Additionally, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) has brought a constitutional challenge to key aspects of the legal and operational framework that governs CSEC. The suit alleges that CSEC’s current operations and limited oversight infringe sections 8 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which enshrine the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure and the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication. [21] The BCCLA has also filed a proposed national class action lawsuit on behalf of Canadians whose private communications and metadata have been collected by CSEC in a manner that violates the Charter. [22] The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) has also launched a lawsuit, challenging the constitutionality of key provisions of PIPEDA, Canada’s federal data protection statute, which prevent private companies such as ISPs from effectively notifying customers when their data has been handed over to state agencies such as CSEC for investigative purposes. [23] Finally, the federal privacy commissioner also released information concerning the regularity at which telecommunications companies were asked for data by government agencies in 2011, though without specificity concerning how often these requests were made by, or on the behalf of, CSEC. [24]

De plus, l’association des libertés civiles de Colombie-Britannique (British Columbia Civil Liberties Association – BCCLA) a mené un défi constitutionnel sur les aspects-clé du cadre opérationnel et légal qui gouverne le CSTC. La poursuite juridique soutient que les opérations actuelles du CSTC et leur faible supervision enfreint les sections 8 et 2(b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés qui protège le droit de ne pas subir d’examens et perquisitions déraisonnables, ainsi que la liberté de pensée, de croyance, d’opinion et d’expression, y compris la liberté de la presse et d’autres média de communication. [21] La BCCLA a aussi rempli une proposition de recours collectif national au nom des Canadiens dont les communications et métadonnées ont été collectées par le CSTC d’une façon qui viole la Charte. [22] L’association canadienne des libertés civiles (Canadian Civil Liberties Association – CCLA) a aussi lancé une poursuite, défiant la constitutionnalité de provisions-clé de LPRDE (PIPEDA en anglais), la loi de protection des données fédérales du Canada , qui empêche les entreprises privées telles que les FAIs de notifier à leurs clients que leurs données ont été saisies par des agences gouvernementales telles que le CSTC à des fins d’investigation. [23] Finalement, le commissaire fédéral à la vie privée a également publié des informations relatives à la régularité des demandes de données aux entreprises de télécommunication par les agences gouvernementales en 2011, bien que ce soit sans spécificité concernant la fréquence à laquelle ces requêtes ont été faites par, ou au nom de, le CSTC. [24]:

In conclusion, the media and Parliament’s attention to signals intelligence has increased significantly, and these efforts have dovetailed with ongoing concerns over the scope and nature of privacy-invasive activities by domestic state agencies. However, this attention has yet to culminate in any concrete outcomes, as the federal government has so far refused to respond to public criticism of CSEC’s activities. The most promising actions to date have manifested in the courts, though these actions remain in a nascent state.

En conclusion, l’attention des médias et du Parlement envers le renseignement numérique ait augmentée de façon significative et que ces efforts se soient imbriqués dans les inquiétudes existantes sur la portée et la nature des activités invasives vis-à-vis de la vie privée par les agences gouvernementales. Toutefois, cette attention doit encore culminer dans des résultats concrets, du fait que le gouvernement fédéral ait pour l’instant refusé de répondre à la critique publique des activités du CSTC. Aujourd’hui, les actions les plus prometteuses se sont manifestées dans les cours de justice, bien que ces actions restent à un état naissant.:

Références

[1] Colin Freeze and Stephanie Nolen. 2013. “Charges that Canada spied on Brazil unveil CSEC’s inner workings,” The Globe and Mail, October 7, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/brazil-spying-report-spotlights-canadaselectronic-eavesdroppers/article14720003/; Colin Freeze, “Read a CSEC Document that was first acquired by Edward Snowden,” The Globe and Mail, November 30, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/read-a-csec-document-onbrazil-that-was-first-acquired-by-edward-snowden/article15699941/; for the most publicly detailed analysis of the program see: Anonymous, “OLYMPIA: How Canada's CSEC maps phone and internet connections,” Top Level Communications, May 14, 2014, http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csecmaps-phone-and.html.

[2] “Government Announces Steps to Restore Confidence on Encryption Standards,” http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-restoreconfidence-on-encryption-standards/; Michael Geist, “Canada Facilitated NSA’s Effort to Weaken Encryption Standards”, September 11, 2013, MichaelGeist.ca, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6951/196/; Omar El Akkad, “The Strange Connection Between the NSA and an Ontario Tech Firm”, January 20, 2014, Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/business-technology/thestrange-connection-between-the-nsa-and-an-ontario-tech-firm/article16402341/.

[3] “NSA document raises questions about Canada in G8 spying,” http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nsa-document-raises-questions-about-canada-in-g8spying-1.2447398; “NSA Briefing Note on G8/G20 Summits,” http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/summit-doc.pdf.

[4] Greg Weston, Glen Greenwald & R> Gallagher, “CSEC used airport Wi-Fi to track Canadian travellers: Edward Snowden documents,” January 31, 2014, CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadiantravellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881; “IP Profiling Analytics & Mission Impacts (Snowden slides),” http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf; for analyses of the slides see: Tope Level Telecommunications, “Did CSEC really track Canadian airport travellers”, February 4, 2014, http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html; and R. Deibert, “Now we know Ottawa can snoop on any Canadian. What are we going to do?” January 31, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/now-weknow-ottawa-can-snoop-on-any-canadian-what-are-we-going-to-do/article16625310/.

[5] Colin Freeze, “How CSEC Became an Electronic Spying Giant”, November 30, 2013, Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/how-csecbecame-an-electronic-spying-giant/article15699694/; Ian MacLeod, “Canadian Spies Receive U.S. Money for Research and Surveillance, Book Says”, December 5, 2014, Ottawa Citizen, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/Canadian+spies+receive+money+research+surveillance+book+says/9835864/story.html.

[6] “Globe Editorial: Hey CSEC, stop spying on me,” April 3, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/dont-spy-on-mecsec/article17781948/; “Globe Editorial: Canada needs a royal commission on spying and privacy of Canadians,”, May 21, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/we-need-a-royalcommission-on-spying/article18786038/; “Canada’s oversight of spy agencies falls short,” http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2014/02/02/canadas_oversight_of_spy_agencies_falls_short_editorial.html; “National Post Editorial Board: Our spies need oversight,” October 11, 2013, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/10/11/national-post-editorial-board-ourspies-need-oversight/.

[7] See: the “Protect Our Privacy Coalition", https://openmedia.ca/ourprivacy. Major actions by participants include: “Call on your MP to stand against costly online spying,” https://openmedia.ca/stand; “World Speaks Out Against Mass Surveillance in Global Day of Online Protest: Day We Fight Back,” https://www.cippic.ca/en/news/day_we_fight_back; L. Tribe, “The day we fight back: Stand up against mass surveillance,” February 11, 2014, https://cjfe.org/blog/daywe-fight-back-stand-against-mass-surveillance; PEN Canada, “The Day We Fight Back: Calling for an End to Mass Surveillance,” February 11, 2014, http://pencanada.ca/campaigns/day-we-fight-back-pen-canada-calls-end-masssurveillance/. Other major online actions have included: “Tell Harper: Defend Online Privacy,” https://openmedia.ca/defendprivacy; “Call on your MP to stand against costly online spying,” https://openmedia.ca/stand; “Stand with the BCCLA,” https://openmedia.ca/csec; “Protect Our Privacy,” https://openmedia.ca/ourprivacy.

[8] Examples include: Ontario Information & Privacy Commissioner, “Big Surveillance Demands Big Privacy - Enter Privacy-Protective Surveillance”, Toronto, http://www.realprivacy.ca/index.php/international-privacy-day-symposium/; “The Politics of Surveillance: Advancing Democracy in a Surveillance Society,” May 8-10 at University of Ottawa; “Munk Debates on State Surveillance,” May 2, 2014; RightsWatch Conference 2013, September 20-21, 2013, Toronto, http://ccla.org/events/rightswatch-2013/#Program; “CSEC Panel,” April 8, 2014 at Queen’s University; “Intelligence and National Security Panel,” March 21, 2014 at University of Toronto; “Privacy at Risk? The NSA and CSEC, its Canadian Surveillance Partner,” March 12, 2014 at University of Toronto; “Who is Watching the Watchers? A Panel of Canadian Privacy and Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era”, October 16, 2013, University of Ottawa, Centre for Law, Technology & Society.

[9] “Transparent Lives: Surveillance in Canada,” http://www.aupress.ca/index.php/books/120237.

[10] “The Ottawa Statement on Mass Surveillance,” http://www.digitallymediatedsurveillance.ca/the-ottawa-statement/.

[11] “Towards Transparency in Canadian Telecommunications,” https://citizenlab.org/2014/01/towards-transparency-canadian-telecommunications/; “The Murky State of Canadian Telecommunications Surveillance,” https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/murky-state-canadian-telecommunicationssurveillance/; “IXMaps - See where your packets go,” http://ixmaps.ca/.

[12] “Data Privacy Transparency of Canadian Internet Service Providers,” http://ixmaps.ca/transparency.php; “Responding to the Crisis in Canadian Telecommunications,” https://citizenlab.org/2014/05/responding-crisis-canadiantelecommunications/.

[13] C. Freeze, C. Dobby & J. Wingrove, "TekSavvy, Rogers Break Silence Over Government Requests for Data", June 5, 2014, Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/tech-news/teksavvy-opens-books-ongovernment-data-requests/article18999107/. M. Geist, "Rogers' Shocking Admission: It Does Not Track Disclosures of Subscriber Information to Authorities", June 6, 2014, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/7151/125/

[14] Proceedings of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Canada’s National Security and Defence Policies, Practices, Circumstances and Capabilities, February 3, 2014, 62 Elizabeth II, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, Issue 2, http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/412/SECD/pdf/02issue.pdf.

[15] Charmaine Borg, Terrebonne-Blainville, QC, “Charmaine Borg on Request for Emergency Debate”, excerpts from: House of Commons Debates, June 13, 2013, 62 Elizabeth II, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, http://openparliament.ca/debates/2013/6/13/charmaine-borg-1/only/.

[16] Debates of the Senate, October 24, 2013, 62 Elizabeth II, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, Volume 149, Issue 5, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/412/Debates/005db_2013-10-24e.htm#35.

[17] Christopher Parsons, “Mapping the Canadian Government’s Telecommunications Surveillance”, March 27, 2014, Citizen Lab, https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/mapping-canadian-governments-telecommunicationssurveillance/; Michael Geist, “How Telcos and ISPs Hand Over Subscriber Data Thousands of Times Each Year Without a Warrant”, April 1, 2014, MichaelGeist.ca, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/7100/135/; Order/Address of the House of Commons, “Responses to Written Question Q-233 - Ms. Borg (TerrebonneBlainville)”, march 24, 2014, et seq, http://www.christopher-parsons.com/Main/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/8555-412-233.pdf.

[18] Bill S-220, An Act to Establish the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, October 16, 2013, 62 Elizabeth II, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 1st Reading, http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/412/Private/S-220/S-220_1/S220_1.PDF. Bill C-551, An Act to Establish the National Security Committee of Parliamentarians, November 7, 2013, 62 Elizabeth II, 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 1st Reading, http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/412/Private/C-551/C-551_1/C551_1.PDF.

[19] Michael Geist, “Why CSEC and CSIS Should Be the Subject of an Independent Investigation”, January 8, 2014, MichaelGeist.ca, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/7043/135/.

[20] Re X, 2013 FC 1275, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2013/2013fc1275/2013fc1275.html. See also: Re X, 2009 FC 1058, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2009/2009fc1058/2009fc1058.html and Re CSIS Act, 2008 FC 301, https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2007/2007canlii62002/2007canlii62002.html.

[21] British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, “Spying in Canada: Civil Liberties Watchdog Sues Surveillance Agency Over Illegal Spying on Canadians”, October 22, 2013, BCCLA.org, http://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Final-PressRelease-Spying-10_21_131.pdf; British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Attorney General of Canada, British Columbia Supreme Court File No.: VLC-S-S137827, October 22, 2013, Notice of Civil Claim, http://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013-10-22-Notice-of-Civil-Claim.pdf.

[22] British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, “Illegal Spying: BCCLA Files Class Action Lawsuit Against Canada’s Electronic Spy Agency”, April 1, 2014, BCCLA.org, http://bccla.org/news/2014/04/illegal-spying-bccla-files-class-action-lawsuit-againstcanadas-electronic-spy-agency/; Lyster v. Attorney General of Canada, Federal Court File No. T-796-14, Statement of Claim, April 1, 2014, http://bccla.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/20140401-Statement-of-Claim-Class ActionProceeding.pdf; Omar Ha-Redeye, “BCCLA Files Class Action for Spying by CSEC”, April 13, 2014, Slaw.ca, http://www.slaw.ca/2014/04/13/bccla-files-class-action-forspying-by-csec/.

[23] Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), “The Canadian Civil Liberties Association Challenges Constitutionality of Privacy Legislation”, May 22, 2014, CCLA.org, http://ccla.org/2014/05/22/press-release-ccla-challenges-constitutionalityof-privacy-legislation/; Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association et. al. v. Attorney General of Canada, Ontario Superior Court File No.: CV-14-504139, Notice of Application, May 13, 2014, http://ccla.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/Notice-of-Application-re-PIPEDA-Issued.pdf.

[24] Bernier, Chantal, “Statement from the Interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada Regarding Telecommunications Companies’ Responses to Information Requests from Government Authorities”, April 30, 2014, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2014/s-d_140430_e.asp, Canadian Wireless Telecommunication Association, “Response to Request for General Information From Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association (the “CWTA”) Members”, December 14, 2011, http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nrc/2014/let_140430_e.pdf; Michael Geist, “Canadian Telcos Asked to Disclose Subscriber Data Every 27 Seconds”, April 30, 2014, MichaelGeist.ca, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/7116/125/. Correspondents: Micheal Vonn, Christopher Parsons and Tamir Israel.