Paquet Telecom 2017/amendements ITRE

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Révision de 7 septembre 2017 à 11:56 par Adc (discussion | contributions)

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Voting list des amendements déposés en commission ITRE

Sommaire

Amendment 297 ++[modifier]

Amendment 297
Morten Helveg Petersen
ALDE
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – indent 1

- obligations imposed by national law in accordance with Union law or by Union law in respect of services provided using electronic communications networks and services ; - measures taken at Union or national level, in compliance with Union law, to pursue general interest objectives, in particular relating to content regulation and audio-visual policy. - the provisions of Directive 2014/53/EU.

- obligations imposed by national law in accordance with Union law or by Union law in respect of services provided using electronic communications networks and services ; - measures taken at Union or national level, in compliance with Union law, to pursue general interest objectives, in particular relating to the protection of personal data and privacy, content regulation and audio-visual policy


Take into account the protection of personal data and privacy, content regulation and audio-visual policy


Amendment 298 ++[modifier]

Amendment 298
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1

(1) ‘electronic communications network’ means transmission systems, whether or not based on a permanent infrastructure or centralised administration capacity, and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources, including network elements which are not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed;

(1) ‘electronic communications network’ means transmission systems, whether or not based on a permanent infrastructure or centralised administration capacity, and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources, including network elements which are not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed; it does not include network elements managed by individuals in the context of not-for-profit activities;

Justification: Individuals participating in a not-for-profit network (such as radio local area networks) or providing not-for-profit services shall not be subject to the obligations imposed on legal persons providing networks or services. Specifically, the strict obligations provided by the Directive 2002/58/CE would be disproportionate and impracticable if imposed on individual volunteers, who should only be subject to the obligations set by the General Data Protection Regulation.


Inclusion of not-for-profit organisations.

Amendment 299 -[modifier]

Amendment 299
Evžen Tošenovský
ECR
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an electronic communications network which either consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions similar network performance in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an publicly available electronic communications network which either consists wholly or partially of optical fibre elements.

Amendment 301 +[modifier]

Amendment 301
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an electronic communications network which either consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions similar network performance in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an electronic communications network which either consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location corresponding in the fixed-line connection case to the premises and in the mobile connection case to the base station, or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions at least the same network performance in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered at least the same regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.

Justification: Clarification included from the respective Recital 13. Moreover, strengthening the performance benchmark while lifting its upper limit. This clarifies that – independent of the used technology – better performing infrastructures would also be considered ‘very high capacity’.

Amendment 312 +[modifier]

Amendment 312
Edouard Martin
S&D
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an electronic communications network which either consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions similar network performance in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an electronic communications network which either consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the premises or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions at least similar network performance in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.

Amendment 313 +[modifier]

Amendment 313
Anne Sander, Françoise Grossetête
S&D
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an electronic communications network which either consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at the serving location or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions similar network performance in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.

(2) 'very high capacity network' means an electronic communications network which either consists wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the premises or which is capable of delivering under usual peak-time conditions at least the same network performance in terms of available down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its variation. Network performance can be considered similar regardless of whether the end-user experience varies due to the inherently different characteristics of the medium by which the network ultimately connects with the network termination point.


Same as 312


Amendment 316 ++[modifier]

Amendment 316
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4

(4) ‘electronic communications service’ means a service normally provided for remuneration via electronic communications networks, which encompasses 'internet access service' as defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120; and/or 'interpersonal communications service'; and/or services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals such as transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services and for broadcasting, but excludes services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services;

(4) ‘electronic communications service’ means a service provided for remuneration via electronic communications networks, which encompasses 'internet access service' as defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120; and/or 'interpersonal communications service'; and/or services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals such as transmission services used for the provision of machine-to-machine services and for broadcasting, but excludes services providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services as well as not-for-profit-services provided by individuals;

Justification: Individuals participating in a not-for-profit network (such as radio local area networks) or providing not-for-profit services shall not be subject to the obligations imposed on legal persons providing networks or services. Specifically, the strict obligations provided by the Directive 2002/58/CE would be disproportionate and impracticable if imposed on individual volunteers, who should only be subject to the obligations set by the General Data Protection Regulation.

Amendment 318 -[modifier]

Amendment 318
Kaja Kallas
ALDE
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5

(5) 'interpersonal communications service’ means a service normally provided for remuneration that enables direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information via electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s); it does not include services which enable interpersonal and interactive communication merely as a minor ancillary feature that is intrinsically linked to another service;

(5) 'interpersonal communications service’ means a service normally provided for remuneration where the principal purpose of the service is devoted to enabling direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information via electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s);

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


Excludes ancillary interpersonal communication services from the scope

Amendment 319 -[modifier]

Amendment 319
Barbara Kappel, Angelo Ciocca, Lorenzo Fontana
ENF
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5

(5) 'interpersonal communications service’ means a service normally provided for remuneration that enables direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information via electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s); it does not include services which enable interpersonal and interactive communication merely as a minor ancillary feature that is intrinsically linked to another service;

(5) 'interpersonal communications service' means an electronic communications service whose primary purpose is to enable normally provided for remuneration that enables direct interpersonal and interactive exchange of information via electronic communications networks between a finite number of persons, whereby the persons initiating or participating in the communication determine its recipient(s); it does not include services which enable interpersonal and interactive communication merely as an a minor ancillary feature that is intrinsically linked to another service;


Excludes ancillary interpersonal communication services from the scope


Amendment 325 -[modifier]

Amendment 325
Barbara Kappel, Angelo Ciocca, Lorenzo Fontana
ENF
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

(7) 'number-independent interpersonal communications service' means an interpersonal communications service which does not connect with the public switched telephone network, either by means of assigned numbering resources, i.e. a number or numbers in national or international telephone numbering plans, or by enabling communication with a number or numbers in national or international telephone numbering plans;

(7) 'number-independent interpersonal communications service' means an interpersonal communications service which does not connect with the public switched telephone network, either by means of assigned numbering resources, i.e. a number or numbers in the national telephone numbering plan, or by enabling communication with a number or numbers in national or international telephone numbering plans; it does not include information society services that allow interpersonal and interactive communication as a secondary feature;


Excludes information society services that allow interpersonal and interactive communication as a secondary feature from the scope


Amendment 333 ++[modifier]

Amendment 333
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 23

(23) ‘general authorisation’ means a legal framework established by the Member State ensuring rights for the provision of electronic communications networks or services and laying down sector-specific obligations that may apply to all or to specific types of electronic communications networks and services, in accordance with this Directive.

(23) ‘general authorisation’ means a legal framework established by the Member State ensuring rights for the provision of electronic communications networks or services and laying down sector-specific obligations that may apply to all or to specific types of electronic communications networks and services, in accordance with this Directive, excluding not-for-profit-services provided by individuals.


Excluding not-for-profit-services provided by individuals is a way to enable innovation and development of services by individuals who would be discouraged from proposing services with administrative obligations


Amendment 334 -[modifier]

Amendment 334
Barbara Kappel, Angelo Ciocca, Lorenzo Fontana
ENF
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 26

(26) 'shared use of radio spectrum' means access by two or more users to use the same frequencies under a defined sharing arrangement, authorised by a national regulatory authority on the basis of a general authorisation, individual rights of use or a combination thereof, including regulatory approaches such as licenced shared access aiming to facilitate the shared use of a frequency band, subject to a binding agreement of all parties involved, in accordance with sharing rules as included in their rights of use so as to guarantee to all users predictable and reliable sharing arrangements, and without prejudice to the application of competition law;

(26) 'shared use of radio spectrum' means access by two or more users to use the same frequencies under a defined sharing arrangement, authorised by a national regulatory authority on the basis of a general authorisation, individual rights of use or a combination thereof;


This AM deletes the part that promotes the development of licenced shared access.


Amendment 343 +[modifier]

Amendment 343
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

National regulatory and other competent authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

National regulatory and other competent authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of freedom of expression and information, cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


Promotes freedom of expression and information


Amendment 344 +[modifier]

Amendment 344
Morten Helveg Petersen
ALDE
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

National regulatory and other competent authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

National regulatory and other competent authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the protection of personal data and privacy, the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.


Promotes the protection of personal data and privacy


Amendment 345 +[modifier]

Amendment 345
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

National regulatory and other competent authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

National regulatory and other competent authorities shall contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

Justification: Despite the fact that the Directive does not lay down substantive rules regarding content and only on networks and services, national authorities need to play close attention to the impact that markets have on each other. The degree of competition in telecommunications markets can significantly impact media and content pluralism in Europe, reducing consumers’ ability to access the content and services of their choice.


This AM give the NRAs the obligation to take into account policies such as media pluralism


Amendment 346 +[modifier]

Amendment 346
José Blanco López, Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández, Soledad Cabezón Ruiz
S&D
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

National regulatory and other competent authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

National regulatory and other competent authorities shall contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

Justification: This provision aims at ensuring a strong commitment of NRA and other competent authorities with the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, and media pluralism.


Same as AM 344 - This AM give the NRAs the obligation to take into account policies such as media pluralism


Amendment 347 +[modifier]

Amendment 347
David Borrelli, Dario Tamburrano
EFDD
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

National regulatory and other competent authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

National regulatory and other competent authorities shall contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism.

Justification: National authorities need to play close attention to the impact that markets have on each other.


Same as AM 344 - This AM give the NRAs the obligation to take into account policies such as media pluralism


Amendment 348 +[modifier]

Amendment 348
Pervenche Berès
S&D
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Les autorités de régulation nationales et les autres autorités compétentes peuvent contribuer, dans la limite de leurs compétences, à la mise en œuvre des politiques visant à promouvoir la diversité culturelle et linguistique ainsi que le pluralisme dans les médias.

Les autorités de régulation nationales et les autres autorités compétentes contribuent, dans la limite de leurs compétences, à la mise en œuvre des politiques visant à promouvoir la diversité culturelle et linguistique ainsi que le pluralisme dans les médias.


Same as AM 344 - This AM give the NRAs the obligation to take into account policies such as media pluralism


Amendment 356 +[modifier]

Amendment 356
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) promote access to, and take-up of, very high capacity data connectivity, both fixed and mobile, by all Union citizens and businesses;

(a) promote the availability and affordability of and access to very high capacity data connectivity, both fixed and mobile and of interpersonal communications services, by all Union citizens and businesses;

Justification: In a market economy where consumers can leverage their collective power, it should always be them (and not governments, regulators or companies) who freely decide whether they want to take up a new service or not. The objective of EU telecom regulation has always been to guide regulatory intervention towards the offer side of the market, ensuring wholesale and retail competition, and the availability of services and networks. If regulation would aim to guide the demand side of the market too, it could condition the promotion of efficiency, transparency and fairness in markets, and of consumer protection. The regulatory framework must therefore continue focusing on availability and affordability of services.

Amendment 357 +[modifier]

Amendment 357
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Dan Nica, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Jeppe Kofod
S&D
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) promote access to, and take-up of, very high capacity data connectivity, both fixed and mobile, by all Union citizens and businesses;

(a) promote the availability and affordability of and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity data connectivity, both fixed and mobile, by all Union citizens and businesses;

Justification: Both availability and affordability are important for bridging digital divide.


Same as 356

Amendment 363 -[modifier]

Amendment 363
Anne Sander, Françoise Grossetête
EPP
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and associated facilities, including efficient infrastructure-based competition, and in the provision of electronic communications services and associated services;

(b) promote sustainable competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and associated facilities, including efficient infrastructure-based competition, and in the provision of electronic communications services and associated services;

Amendment 382 +[modifier]

Amendment 382
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point f

(f) imposing ex ante regulatory obligations only to the extent necessary to secure effective and sustainable competition on the retail market concerned and relaxing or lifting such obligations as soon as that condition is fulfilled.

deleted

Amendment 392 +[modifier]

Amendment 392
Morten Helveg Petersen
ALDE
Article 4 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall cooperate with each other and with the Commission in the strategic planning, coordination and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum in the Union. To this end, they shall take into consideration, inter alia, the economic, safety, health, public interest, public security and defence, freedom of expression, cultural, scientific, social and technical aspects of EU policies as well as the various interests of radio spectrum user communities with the aim of optimising the use of radio spectrum and avoiding harmful interference.

1. Member States shall cooperate with each other and with the Commission in the strategic planning, coordination and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum in the Union. To this end, they shall take into consideration, inter alia, the economic, safety, health, public interest, public security and defence, data protection and privacy, freedom of expression, cultural, scientific, social and technical aspects of EU policies as well as the various interests of radio spectrum user communities with the aim of optimising the use of radio spectrum and avoiding harmful interference.


Includes data protection


Amendment 393 -[modifier]

Amendment 393
Barbara Kappel, Angelo Ciocca, Lorenzo Fontana
ENF
Article 4 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall cooperate with each other and with the Commission in the strategic planning, coordination and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum in the Union. To this end, they shall take into consideration, inter alia, the economic, safety, health, public interest, public security and defence, freedom of expression, cultural, scientific, social and technical aspects of EU policies as well as the various interests of radio spectrum user communities with the aim of optimising the use of radio spectrum and avoiding harmful interference.

1. Member States shall cooperate with each other and with the Commission in the strategic planning, coordination and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum, a scarce resource that belongs to the Member States. They might take into consideration, inter alia, the economic, safety, health, public interest, public security and defence, freedom of expression, cultural, scientific, social and technical aspects of EU policies as well as the various interests of radio spectrum user communities with the aim of optimising the use of radio spectrum and avoiding harmful interference.


We promotes the shared spectrum => emphasizing that spectrum belongs to the MS would diminish the scope and possibility to develop the shared spectrum.


Amendment 403 +[modifier]

Amendment 403
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – indent 8

- dealing with issues related to open internet access;

- ensuring compliance with rules related to open internet access;


Reinforce the importance of the open internet access rules


Amendment 404 +[modifier]

Amendment 404
Eva Kaili
S&D
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – indent 8

- dealing with issues related to open internet access;

- ensuring compliance with rules related to open internet access;


Same as 403 - Reinforce the importance of the open internet access rules


Amendment 415 ++[modifier]

Amendment 415
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 10 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities apply Regulation 2015/2120 and BEREC Guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 5.3 of the abovementioned Regulation and coordinate within BEREC with other national regulatory authorities when implementing it.

Justification: The implementation of the regulation 2015/2120 is made on a national basis without any coordination of national regulation authorities, despite the BEREC guidelines.A harmonised implementation within the EU is of the utmost importance for predictability of law and for ensuring end-users rights.


The implementation of the regulation 2015/2120 is made on a national basis without any coordination of national regulation authorities, despite the BEREC guidelines. A harmonised implementation within the EU is of the utmost importance for predictability of law and for ensuring end-users rights.


Amendment 417 ++[modifier]

Amendment 417
Morten Helveg Petersen
ALDE
Article 12 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services, subject to the conditions set out in this Directive. To this end, Member States shall not prevent an undertaking from providing electronic communications networks or services, except where this is necessary for the reasons set out in Article 52 (1) of the Treaty. Any such limitation to the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services shall be duly reasoned and shall be notified to the Commission.

1. Member States shall ensure the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services, subject to the conditions set out in this Directive. To this end, Member States shall not prevent an undertaking from providing electronic communications networks or services, except where this is necessary for the reasons set out in Article 52 (1) of the Treaty. Any such limitation to the freedom to provide electronic communications networks and services shall be duly reasoned, provided for by law, respect the essence of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter and be subject to the principle of proportionality, in accordance with Article 52 (1) of the Charter and notified to the Commission.

Amendment 420 -[modifier]

Amendment 420
Michał Boni, Françoise Grossetête, Anne Sander
EPP
Article 18 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that the rights, conditions and procedures concerning general authorisations and rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbers or rights to install facilities may only be amended in objectively justified cases and in a proportionate manner, taking into consideration, where appropriate, the specific conditions applicable to transferable rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbers.

1. Member States shall ensure that the rights, conditions and procedures concerning general authorisations and rights of use for radio spectrum or for numbers or rights to install facilities may only be amended in objectively justified cases and in a proportionate manner, taking into consideration, where appropriate, the specific conditions applicable to transferable rights of use for radio spectrum and for numbers. In the case of right of use for spectrum, the right holder shall have the right to object to any proposed amendment based on its existing and future spectrum usage plan and the need to safeguard investment.

Justification: Legal certainty as to spectrum usage rights is key to the promotion of investment in mobile networks and in particular in the next generation of mobile, 5G. It is proposed that operators be given the opportunity of objecting to spectrum rights changes on the basis of limited conditions such as future networks spectrum usage plans and the need to safeguard investment not yet fully depreciated.

Amendment 430 +[modifier]

Amendment 430
José Blanco López, Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández, Soledad Cabezón Ruiz
S&D
Article 20 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services associated facilities, or associated services provide all the information, including financial information, necessary for national regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and BEREC to ensure conformity with the provisions of, or decisions made in accordance with, this Directive. In particular, national regulatory authorities shall have the power to require those undertakings to submit information concerning future network or service developments that could have an impact on the wholesale services that they make available to competitors. They may also require information on electronic communications networks and associated facilities which is disaggregated at local level and sufficiently detailed for the national regulatory authority to be able to conduct the geographical survey and to designate digital exclusion areas in accordance with Article 22. In accordance with Article 29, national regulatory authorities may sanction undertakings deliberately providing misleading, erroneous or incomplete information.

Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and BEREC have legal powers to request information, including financial information, from all relevant parties necessary to fulfilling their tasks and ensure conformity with the provisions of, or decisions made in accordance with, this Directive. In particular, national regulatory authorities shall have the power to require those undertakings to submit information concerning network or service developments that could have an impact on the wholesale services that they make available to competitors. They may also require information on electronic communications networks and associated facilities which is disaggregated at local level and sufficiently detailed for the national regulatory authority to be able to conduct the geographical survey and to designate digital exclusion areas in accordance with Article 22.

Justification: NRAs should have legal powers to request information to carry out their duties from any undertaking, whether or not it is defined as Electronic Communication Network/Service provider. This information is particularly relevant for market analyses


This AM reinforces the powers of NRAs to request information.


Amendment 565 ++[modifier]

Amendment 565
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Dan Nica, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Jeppe Kofod, Martina Werner
S&D
Article 40 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to ensure that, when necessary for confidentiality, electronic communications content is encrypted from end-to-end by default, in order to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.

Justification: Encrypting communications content from end to end by default is the best way to effectively minimise the impact of security incidents.


Encrypting communications content from end to end by default is the best way to effectively minimise the impact of security incidents.


Amendment 566 ++[modifier]

Amendment 566
Eva Kaili
S&D
Article 40 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to ensure that, when necessary for confidentiality, electronic communications content is encrypted from end-to-end by default, in order to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.


Encrypting communications content from end to end by default is the best way to effectively minimise the impact of security incidents.


Amendment 567 ++[modifier]

Amendment 567
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 40 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that electronic communications content are encrypted from end-to-end by default, in order to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.

Justification: Encrypting communications content from end to end by default is the only way to effectively minimise the impact of security incidents. Any other measure would barely has any effect.Furthermore, such an obligation would be the mere implementation of Directive 2002/58/EC, article 5(1), which prohibits any “kinds of interception or surveillance of communications (...) by persons other than users, without the consent of the users concerned”.


Encrypting communications content from end to end by default is the best way to effectively minimise the impact of security incidents.


Amendment 568 ++[modifier]

Amendment 568
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 40 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.

1. Member States shall ensure that undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of networks and services. Having regard to the state of the art, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In particular, measures shall be taken to ensure that electronic communications content are encrypted from end-to-end by default, in order to prevent and minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services.

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


Encrypting communications content from end to end by default is the best way to effectively minimise the impact of security incidents.


Amendment 570 +[modifier]

Amendment 570
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 40 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. Member States shall not impose any obligation to undertakings providing public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services that would result in the weakening of the security of their networks and services.

Amendment 575 +[modifier]

Amendment 575
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri
Article 40 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 a (new)

Member States shall ensure that in case of a particular risk of a security incident in public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services providers of such networks or services shall inform their end-users of such a risk and of any possible protective measures or remedies which can be taken by the end-users.

Amendment 578 +[modifier]

Amendment 578
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 40 – paragraph 5 a (new)

5 a. By ...[date] in order to contribute to the consistent application of measures for the security of networks and services, ENISA, shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission and BEREC issue guidelines on minimum criteria and common approaches for the security of networks and services and the promotion of the use of end-to-end encryption.

Amendment 601 +[modifier]

Amendment 601
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Dan Nica, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Jeppe Kofod
S&D
Article 45 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e

(e) promoting the shared use of radio spectrum between similar and/or different uses of spectrum through appropriate established sharing rules and conditions, including the protection of existing rights of use, in accordance with Union law;

(e) promoting the shared use of radio spectrum between similar and/or different uses of spectrum; promoting competition through appropriate established sharing rules and conditions, including the protection of existing rights of use, in accordance with Union law;

Justification: Competition criteria in radio spectrum procedures are important when the procedures are designed. Fair and non-discriminatory wholesale access conditions and consumer choice should be enhanced.


Competition criteria in radio spectrum procedures is important. Fair and non-discriminatory wholesale access conditions and consumer choice should be enhanced.

Amendment 602 +[modifier]

Amendment 602
David Borrelli, Dario Tamburrano
EFDD
Article 45 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e

(e) promoting the shared use of radio spectrum between similar and/or different uses of spectrum through appropriate established sharing rules and conditions, including the protection of existing rights of use, in accordance with Union law;

(e) promoting the shared use of radio spectrum between similar and/or different uses of spectrum promoting competition through appropriate established sharing rules and conditions, including the protection of existing rights of use, in accordance with Union law;

Justification: The amendment aims to promote competition in radio spectrum assignment procedures.


Same as AM 601 - The amendment aims to promote competition in radio spectrum assignment procedures.


Amendment 603 ++[modifier]

Amendment 603
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 45 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new)

(e a) The Commission shall establish a programme aiming to release spectrum for shared and unlicensed uses. This programme shall include the development of a European database of shared and unlicensed spectrum.

Justification: Innovation and freedom of expression need a broad access to shared and unlicensed uses of , as stressed in article 6 of the 2012 Radio Spectrum Policy Programme. Increasing this access is thus a major challenge. Following the success of the release of the 1,2 Ghz frequencies within the Radio spectrum policy programme (Article 3 of Decision 243/2012/EU), the European Commission shall launch such a programme aiming at the release of shared spectrum. A database of shared spectrum would greatly facilitate and encourage the release of shared spectrum.

Amendment 636 -[modifier]

Amendment 636
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 – introductory part

When applying a general authorisation or individual rights taking in account measures adopted under Decision No 676/2002/EC where the radio spectrum band concerned has been harmonised, Member States shall seek to minimise problems of harmful interference, including in cases of shared use of radio spectrum on the basis of a combination of general authorisation and individual rights of use. In so doing, they shall have regard to the need:

2. Where appropriate, Member States shall consider the possibility to authorise the use of radio spectrum based on a combination of general authorisation and individual rights of use. They shall in particular consider the possibility of the gradual transfer from general authorisation to individual rights of use where necessary to foster innovation and facilitate market entry of smaller market participants. They shall favour technological solutions for the management of potential harmful interference with a view to choose the least restrictive authorisation regime possible.

Justification: There is a need to simplify the procedure as proposed. In addition, in accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text

Amendment 645 -[modifier]

Amendment 645
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 a (new)

When authorising the shared use of spectrum, Member States shall minimise the restrictions to the use of radio spectrum to what is necessary to avoid harmful interference, including by limiting to the best extent possible the application of the non-interference, non-protection principle. Where such principles shall apply, Member States shall take measures to ensure protection against out-of-and interference from adjacent bands.

Amendment 665 +[modifier]

Amendment 665
András Gyürk
EPP
Article 49 – paragraph 2

2. Where Member States grant rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum for a limited period of time, those rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum shall be valid for a duration of at least 25 years, except in the case of temporary rights, temporary extension of rights pursuant to paragraph 3 and rights for secondary use in harmonised bands.

deleted


Removes the duration of 25 years licencing

Amendment 670 +[modifier]

Amendment 670
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 49 – paragraph 2

2. Where Member States grant rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum for a limited period of time, those rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum shall be valid for a duration of at least 25 years, except in the case of temporary rights, temporary extension of rights pursuant to paragraph 3 and rights for secondary use in harmonised bands.

2. Where Member States grant rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum for a limited period of time, those rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum shall be valid for a maximum duration of 25 years, except in the case of temporary rights, temporary extension of rights pursuant to paragraph 3 and rights for secondary use in harmonised bands.Where rights of use have been granted for a duration of 25 years, Member states shall conduct reviews at regular intervals of every 5 years to assess if the use of spectrum is the most efficient in light of technological or market evolution, and where justified and necessary shall amend such rights in accordance with articles 50 and 51.

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


Maximum 25 years with a review every 5 years


Amendment 674 ++[modifier]

Amendment 674
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 49 – paragraph 2

2. Where Member States grant rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum for a limited period of time, those rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum shall be valid for a duration of at least 25 years, except in the case of temporary rights, temporary extension of rights pursuant to paragraph 3 and rights for secondary use in harmonised bands.

2. Where Member States grant rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum for a limited period of time, those rights of use for harmonised radio spectrum shall be valid for a maximum duration of 25 years, reviewed at regular intervals of maximum 5 years for assessing and amending the rights according to laydown procedures.

Justification: The draft Code proposes to extend to a minimum of 25 years the duration of rights to use the radio spectrum. This is disproportionate and unnecessary. Experience shows us that 20 years is already too long, especially considering that the regulation does not enable regulators to act when necessary, e.g. by withdrawing authorisation, even if the operator fails to honor its commitments. Allocating spectrum for more than 5 years would necessitate adding a revision clause/sunset date regularly, with sanctions if the operator fails its obligations. The maximum length of allocation shall be 25 years, with such scheduled sunset dates.The "use it or lose it" clause proposed in the Code is insufficient to enable NRAs to withdraw authorisation if necessary. The capacities of the NRAs should thus be enhanced and more detailed in order to control the use of the licences, preventing holders from "parking" frequencies for too long, thereby hindering connectivity and innovation.

Amendment 702 ++[modifier]

Amendment 702
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 55 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Where that provision is not commercial in character or is ancillary to another commercial activity or public service which is not dependent on the conveyance of signals on those networks, any undertaking, public authority or end-user providing such access shall not be subject to any general authorisation for the provision of electronic communications networks or services pursuant to Article 12, to obligations regarding end-users rights pursuant to Title III of Part III of this Directive nor to obligations to interconnect their networks pursuant to Article 59 (1).

Where that provision is not commercial in character or is ancillary to another commercial activity or public service which is not dependent on the conveyance of signals on those networks, any undertaking, public authority or user providing such access shall not be subject to any general authorisation for the provision of electronic communications networks or services pursuant to Article 12, to obligations regarding users rights pursuant to Title III of Part III of this Directive nor to obligations to interconnect their networks pursuant to Article 59 (1). Individuals providing such access not-for-profit shall not be liable for information transmitted by third parties over such access.

Justification: The Proposal intends to foster the development of radio local area networks, especially where they provide services which are not commercial in character. The development of such networks mainly depends on the personal participation of individual volunteers, who expend the networks by managing their own relays and access points. However, such a participation is hindered by several laws which seek to prevent the sharing of Internet connections amongst several users by making people responsible (and potentially liable) for all communication made through their Wi-Fi connection, and create legal risks for people sharing their connection.In Germany, rights-holders have used a "secondary liability" doctrine to chill the growth of the community networks movement. In France too, copyright law imposes a secondary liability regime that creates significant legal uncertainty for people sharing their network connections with other users. The so-called "mere conduit", inscribed in EU law since 2000 in the directive on information society services, needs to be clearly guaranteed and expanded to small-area wireless access points.In the same spirit, contract clauses that forbid subscribers to share their connections with others should be prohibited in any case: the possibility to share their connections should not be limited to specific offers.Promoting a right to share Internet connections is all the more vital considering the economic and ecological crises, as well as the rapid increase of populations that cannot afford access to the Internet. In this context, connection sharing can play a critical role in fostering a more equitable and sustainable use of telecommunications infrastructure.


This AM aims to avoid legal risks for people sharing their connection


Amendment 703 ++[modifier]

Amendment 703
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 55 – paragraph 2

2. Competent authorities shall not prevent providers of public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services from allowing access to their networks to the public, through radio local area networks, which may be located at an end-user's premises, subject to compliance with the applicable general authorisation conditions and the prior informed agreement of the end-user.

2. Competent authorities shall not prevent providers of public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services from allowing access to their networks to the public, through radio local area networks, which may be located at an end-user's premises, subject to compliance with the applicable general authorisation conditions and the prior informed agreement of the end-user. Individuals providing access to their networks for non-commercial purposes shall not be liable for information transmitted by third parties through the use of such access.

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


This AM aims to avoid legal risks for people sharing their connection


Amendment 706 ++[modifier]

Amendment 706
José Blanco López, Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto, Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández, Soledad Cabezón Ruiz
S&D
Article 55 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. End-users allowing access to their internet access service as set out in paragraph 2 shall not be liable for any use that other end-users might do while connected to their network.

Justification: Sharing of consumers' private Wi-Fi networks may bring benefits to consumers as they can use additional access points. However, it is imperative that such additional networks are only installed on consumers' private equipment with their explicit consent and that the consumer whose internet access service is being shared is under no circumstance responsible nor liable for any use that other person might do while connected to his Wi-Fi network.


This AM aims to avoid legal risks for people sharing their connection


Amendment 708 --[modifier]

Amendment 708
Evžen Tošenovský
ECR
Article 55 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a

a) the right of end-users to accede to radio local area networks of their choice provided by third parties;

deleted


This AM removes the right of users to accede to radio local area networks of their choice.

Amendment 710 --[modifier]

Amendment 710
Evžen Tošenovský
ECR
Article 55 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b

b) the right of end-users to allow reciprocally or more generally access to the networks of such providers by other end-users through radio local area networks, including on the basis of third-party initiatives which aggregate and make publicly accessible the radio local area networks of different end-users.

deleted


This AM removes the provisions giving end-users the rights to share their own access with other uses.

Amendment 712 +[modifier]

Amendment 712
Evžen Tošenovský
ECR
Article 55 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

To that end, providers of public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services shall make available and actively offer, clearly and transparently, products or specific offers allowing its end-users to provide access to third parties through a radio local area network.

deleted


Contract clauses that forbid subscribers to share their connections with others should be prohibited in any case: the possibility to share their connections should not be limited to specific offers.


Amendment 713 +[modifier]

Amendment 713
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 55 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

To that end, providers of public communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services shall make available and actively offer, clearly and transparently, products or specific offers allowing its end-users to provide access to third parties through a radio local area network.

deleted

Justification: Contract clauses that forbid subscribers to share their connections with others should be prohibited in any case: the possibility to share their connections should not be limited to specific offers.


Contract clauses that forbid subscribers to share their connections with others should be prohibited in any case: the possibility to share their connections should not be limited to specific offers.


Amendment 717 +[modifier]

Amendment 717
Pervenche Berès, Edouard Martin
S&D
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Pour réaliser les objectifs exposés à l’article 3, les autorités de régulation nationales encouragent et, le cas échéant, assurent, conformément aux dispositions de la présente directive, un accès et une interconnexion adéquats, ainsi que l’interopérabilité des services et elles s’acquittent de leur tâche de façon à promouvoir l’efficacité économique, à favoriser une concurrence durable et le déploiement de réseaux à très haute capacité, à encourager des investissements efficients et l’innovation et à procurer un avantage maximal à l’utilisateur final. Elles fournissent des orientations et rendent publiques les procédures applicables pour l’obtention de l’accès et de l’interconnexion, afin que les petites et moyennes entreprises et les opérateurs actifs dans une zone géographique limitée puissent bénéficier des obligations imposées.

Pour réaliser les objectifs exposés à l’article 3, les autorités de régulation nationales encouragent et, le cas échéant, assurent, conformément aux dispositions de la présente directive, un accès et une interconnexion adéquats, ainsi que l’interopérabilité des services et elles s’acquittent de leur tâche de façon à promouvoir l’efficacité économique, à favoriser une concurrence durable, le pluralisme des médias, la diversité culturelle, le déploiement de réseaux à très haute capacité, à encourager des investissements efficients et l’innovation et à procurer un avantage maximal à l’utilisateur final. Elles fournissent des orientations et rendent publiques les procédures applicables pour l’obtention de l’accès et de l’interconnexion, afin que les petites et moyennes entreprises et les opérateurs actifs dans une zone géographique limitée puissent bénéficier des obligations imposées.

Amendment 722 /[modifier]

Amendment 722
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point c

(c) in justified cases, obligations on providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services to make their services interoperable, namely where access to emergency services or end-to-end connectivity between end-users is endangered due to a lack of interoperability between interpersonal communications services.

deleted

Amendment 731 ++[modifier]

Amendment 731
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 – point i

(i) to the extent necessary to ensure interoperability of interpersonal communications services and may include obligations relating to the use and implementation of standards or specifications listed in Article 39(1) or of any other relevant European or international standards; and

(i) to the extent necessary to ensure interoperability of interpersonal communications services and may include an obligation to publish and authorize the use, modification and redistribution of any relevant information or an obligation to use or implement of standards or specifications listed in Article 39(1) or of any other relevant European or international standards; and

Justification: Ensuring interoperability of interpersonal communications services requires that the technical information necessary to communicate with the users of such services can be freely accessed, used, modified and redistributed by anyone, whether this information is already public or held by the providers of these services. Encryption should not be jeopardized by such standards.

Amendment 732 +[modifier]

Amendment 732
Kaja Kallas, Marietje Schaake
ALDE
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 – point i

(i) to the extent necessary to ensure interoperability of interpersonal communications services and may include obligations relating to the use and implementation of standards or specifications listed in Article 39(1) or of any other relevant European or international standards; and

(i) to the extent necessary to ensure interoperability of interpersonal communications services and may include obligations relating to the use and implementation of standards or specifications listed in Article 39(1) or of any other relevant European or international standards; such obligations shall not lead to the weakening of security standards of these services.

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text

Amendment 734 -[modifier]

Amendment 734
Angelika Niebler, Herbert Reul, Markus Pieper
EPP
Article 59 – paragraph 2

2. National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

deleted

National regulatory authorities may extend to those owners or undertakings the imposition of such access obligations, on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, beyond the first concentration or distribution point to a concentration point as close as possible to end-users, to the extent strictly necessary to address insurmountable economic or physical barriers to replication in areas with lower population density.

National regulatory authorities shall not impose obligations in accordance with the second subparagraph where:

(a)a viable and similar alternative means of access to end-users is made available to any undertaking, provided that the access is offered on fair and reasonable terms and conditions to a very high capacity network by an undertaking meeting the criteria listed in Article 77 paragraphs (a) and (b); and

(b)in the case of recently deployed network elements, in particular by smaller local projects, the granting of that access would compromise the economic or financial viability of their deployment.

Justification: The EU cost reduction directive (2014/61/EU) contains additional elements of symmetrical regulation. The Commission is to submit a report on the implementation of this directive to the European Parliament and the Council by 1 July 2018. No action should be taken until the findings of the implementation report, which can provide a basis for deciding whether additional elements of symmetrical regulation are needed, are available.

Amendment 735 -[modifier]

Amendment 735
Kaja Kallas
ALDE
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

Where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or technically impossible and the access to such elements is necessary to foster sustainable competition, national regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request, to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, including where necessary to the required associated facilities, on transparency, non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.Such obligations shall only be imposed following a market analysis procedure in accordance with article 65 and shall complement but not replace regulatory measures taken in accordance with article 66 to ensure the effectiveness of the actions of national regulatory authorities to comply with the objectives set out in article 3 of this Directive.

Justification: Symmetric obligations being imposed on all undertaking without regard to their market power shall only be imposed where justified and necessary given their potential negative impact on investment and competition. They should therefore be linked to a market analysis procedure to prevent that they achieve the opposite goals that the obligations taken by regulators under the SMP regime seek to achieve. In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


Limits regulation possibilities


Amendment 737 +[modifier]

Amendment 737
Eva Kaili
S&D
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

Without prejudice to 59(1), national regulatory authorities shall, taking full account of the principle of proportionality impose obligations to meet reasonable requests to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside but close to the building, or beyond it to a concentration point close to end-users, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings on providers of electronic communications networks or electronic communications services that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed shall be objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3(3), and may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access. These measures should be consistent with the provisions of [Broadband Cost reductions Directive]

Amendment 738 +[modifier]

Amendment 738
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

In particular, and without prejudice to the generalities of 59(1), national regulatory authorities may impose obligations to meet reasonable requests for access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building or beyond it to a concentration point close to end-users on providers of electronic communications networks or electronic communications services that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency, non-discrimination and the price of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.When imposing access regulation beyond the first concentration or distribution point, national regulatory authorities may under special circumstances impose active or virtual access to such wiring and cables.

Amendment 739 --[modifier]

Amendment 739
Lieve Wierinck, Hilde Vautmans
ALDE
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

National regulatory authorities may impose obligations to meet reasonable requests for access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, or beyond it to a concentration point close to end-users, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. These access conditions should be imposed on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, and may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors. When imposing access regulation beyond the first concentration or distribution point, national regulatory authorities may, under special circumstances, impose active or virtual access to such wiring and cables.


Removes the obligation to develop broadband networks for false solutions such as VDSL.

Amendment 740 +[modifier]

Amendment 740
Kathleen Van Brempt
S&D
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

National regulatory authorities may impose obligations to address reasonable requests for access to wiring and cables inside buildings, up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, or beyond that point at a concentration point in proximity of the end-user, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors. National regulatory authorities may, when circumstances require it, impose active or virtual access to wiring and cables, in the event of imposing access regulation beyond the first concentration or distribution point.

Amendment 741 +[modifier]

Amendment 741
Gunnar Hökmark, Henna Virkkunen, Bendt Bendtsen
EPP
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations to meet reasonable requests for access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to a concentration or distribution point as close to end-users as possible, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors. Under special circumstances, when access regulation is imposed beyond the first concentration or distribution point, national regulatory authorities may impose active or virtual access to such wiring and cables.

Amendment 742 +[modifier]

Amendment 742
Olle Ludvigsson
S&D
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations upon reasonable request to grant access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point where that point is located outside the building, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency and non-discrimination and for apportioning the costs of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.

National regulatory authorities shall impose obligations to meet reasonable requests for access to wiring and cables inside buildings or up to a concentration or distribution point as close as possible to end-users, on the owners of such wiring and cable or on undertakings that have the right to use such wiring and cables, where this is justified on the grounds that replication of such network elements would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. The access conditions imposed may include specific rules on access, transparency, non-discrimination and the price of access, which, where appropriate, are adjusted to take into account risk factors.When imposing access regulation beyond the first concentration or distribution point, national regulatory authorities may under special circumstances impose active or virtual access to such wiring and cables.

Amendment 753 +[modifier]

Amendment 753
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Dan Nica, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Jeppe Kofod, Flavio Zanonato
S&D
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

National regulatory authorities may extend to those owners or undertakings the imposition of such access obligations, on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, beyond the first concentration or distribution point to a concentration point as close as possible to end-users, to the extent strictly necessary to address insurmountable economic or physical barriers to replication in areas with lower population density.

When imposing access regulation beyond the first concentration or distribution point, national regulatory authorities may under special circumstances impose active or virtual access to such wiring and cables beyond the first concentration or distribution point to a concentration point as close as possible to end-users, to the extent strictly necessary to address insurmountable economic or physical barriers to replication in areas with lower population density.

Justification: National regulatory authorities should have ability to impose regulation as close as possible to end-users if necessary to address economic or physical barriers, especially in areas with low population density.


National regulatory authorities should have ability to impose regulation as close as possible to end-users if necessary to address economic or physical barriers, especially in areas with low population density.


Amendment 757 ++[modifier]

Amendment 757
José Blanco López, Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández, Soledad Cabezón Ruiz
Article 59 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

National regulatory authorities shall not impose obligations in accordance with the second subparagraph where:

deleted

(a) a viable and similar alternative means of access to end-users is made available to any undertaking, provided that the access is offered on fair and reasonable terms and conditions to a very high capacity network by an undertaking meeting the criteria listed in Article 77 paragraphs (a) and (b); and

(b) in the case of recently deployed network elements, in particular by smaller local projects, the granting of that access would compromise the economic or financial viability of their deployment.


Removes limitations to regulation

Amendment 790 -[modifier]

Amendment 790
Evžen Tošenovský
ECR
Article 59 – paragraph 6

6. By [entry into force plus 18 months in order to contribute to a consistent definition of the location of network termination points by national regulatory authorities, BEREC shall, after consulting stakeholders and in close cooperation with the Commission, adopt guidelines on common approaches to the identification of the network termination point in different network topologies. National regulatory authorities shall take utmost account of those guidelines when defining the location of network termination points.

deleted


A common approach within the EU would ensure a predictability for all EU users.


Amendment 792 ++[modifier]

Amendment 792
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.

An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, including through a commercial or a co-investment agreement, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.

Justification: Co-investment in a certain area must be considered an oligopoly of a few powerful actors (on the local level), as the FDN Federation showed in their analysis of the fixed-line market (www.ffdn.org/en/node/129 ) written for a consultation of the ARCEP in 2016. These oligopolies work as a cartel. The co-investors, in a given area, should be regarded as having the position of the incumbent in that area. Such symmetric regulation would allow welcoming all actors into the market.

Amendment 793 +[modifier]

Amendment 793
Kathleen Van Brempt
S&D
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.

An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers or when it is able to disrupt effective competition.

Amendment 794 +[modifier]

Amendment 794
Kaja Kallas
ALDE
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

Two or more undertakings may each be deemed to enjoy a position equivalent to having significant market power when they have the possibility to significantly impede effective competition, taking into account the relevant markets including but not limited to the market shares of other market participants, the market power of an undertaking on closely related markets, barriers to entry, market concentration, product differentiation, capacity constraints and switching costs.

Justification: In light of the increasing trend of convergence between markets, and development of oligopolies in Europe, there is a need to include situations where two or more undertakings can foreclose the markets even without tacit collusion.In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text

Amendment 800 +[modifier]

Amendment 800
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Flavio Zanonato, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod
S&D
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 b (new)

An undertaking shall be deemed to have unilateral market power where, in the absence of significant market power, it enjoys a position of economic strength by virtue of the weakness of competitive constraints in an oligopolistic market, enabling it to act in a manner which is detrimental to consumer welfare.

Justification: Defining unilateral market power can bring tools for NRAs to ensure competition in markets. Oligopolies have become increasingly commonplace in the EU.

Amendment 818 +[modifier]

Amendment 818
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the existence of market developments which may increase the likelihood of the relevant market tending towards effective competition, such as those commercial co-investment or access agreements between operators which benefit competitive dynamics sustainably;

deleted

Justification: The Commission’s proposal weakens the SMP regime. The way in which the 3-criteria test is described in the draft Code differs from the version of the test that has been applied, successfully, by NRAs over the last 15 years and which is set out in Recommendation 2014/710/EU. Article 65 (2) (a) as proposed by the Commission adds a purely speculative element into the market analysis framework. According to BEREC opinion BoR (16) 213 (p.10): “In particular, in order to determine whether a market can be considered for regulation, the new test requires NRAs to take account of market developments which “may increase the likelihood” of a relevant market tending towards effective competition, ultimately making it difficult for NRAs to find that a market can be assessed for SMP.” Constraints on NRAs’ ability to impose regulations have to be avoided. The focus on commercial agreements undermines the SMP regime, as it is linked to a deregulatory promise and might in the long run create cartel-like oligopolies that cannot easily be treated with anti-trust law. The proposal also neglects the connection between cause and effect. Sufficient competition on the retail market results from functioning wholesale markets and should hence by no means be taken as a criterion to deregulate wholesale access. Effective access regulation to the SMP operator’s network is crucial to maintain sustainable retail competition, which in turn leads to lower prices and more choice for consumers.


The Commission’s proposal weakens the SMP regime.


Amendment 831 +[modifier]

Amendment 831
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) all relevant competitive constraints, including at retail level, irrespective of whether the sources of such constraints are deemed to be electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, or other types of services or applications which are comparable from the perspective of the end-user, and irrespective of whether such constraints are part of the relevant market;

(b) all relevant competitive constraints, especially at wholesale level, irrespective of whether the sources of such constraints are deemed to be electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, or other types of services or applications which are comparable from the perspective of the end-user;

Amendment 832 +[modifier]

Amendment 832
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Flavio Zanonato
S&D
Article 65 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) all relevant competitive constraints, including at retail level, irrespective of whether the sources of such constraints are deemed to be electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, or other types of services or applications which are comparable from the perspective of the end-user, and irrespective of whether such constraints are part of the relevant market;

(b) all relevant competitive constraints, on wholesale and retail level level, irrespective of whether the sources of such constraints are deemed to be electronic communications networks, electronic communications services, or other types of services or applications which are comparable from the perspective of the end-user;

Justification: Avoiding the possibility to deregulate on the sole basis of the existence of commercial access agreements is necessary. Putting the focus on commercial agreements for deregulating would weaken and undermine the SMP regime already in place. At the same time, we should avoid the focus on only retail market, as narrowing the scope of competition to the retail level introduces great uncertainty as regards one of the cornerstones of the regulatory framework. Effective access wholesale regulation to the SMP operator’s network is pivotal to establish and maintain an intensive and sustainable retail competition. Sufficient competition on the retail market results from functioning wholesale markets and should hence by no means be taken as a criterion to deregulate wholesale access. Consequently the mere prospect of removing access regulation undermines investments of alternative network operators, which are sensitive to expectations on the (un)reliability of wholesale access products. Therefore, deregulation subject to weak safeguards has to be prevented.


Amendment 872 --[modifier]

Amendment 872
Anna Záborská, Ivan Štefanec
EPP
Article 70

Article 70

deleted

Access to civil engineering

1. A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, civil engineering including, without limitation, buildings or entries to buildings, building cables including wiring, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, poles, masts, ducts, conduits, inspection chambers, manholes, and cabinets, in situations where the market analysis indicates that denial of access or access given under unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level and would not be in the end-user's interest.

2. National regulatory authorities may impose obligations on an operator to provide access in accordance with this Article, irrespective of whether the assets that are affected by the obligation are part of the relevant market in accordance with the market analysis, provided that the obligation is necessary and proportionate to meet the objectives of Article 3.


This AM reduces the operators' obligations on access to network

Amendment 880 --[modifier]

Amendment 880
Michał Boni, Henna Virkkunen, Jerzy Buzek
EPP
Article 70 – paragraph 1

1. A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, civil engineering including, without limitation, buildings or entries to buildings, building cables including wiring, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, poles, masts, ducts, conduits, inspection chambers, manholes, and cabinets, in situations where the market analysis indicates that denial of access or access given under unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level and would not be in the end-user's interest.

1. A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, civil engineering and passive infrastructure including, without limitation, buildings or entries to buildings, building cables including wiring, antennae, towers and other supporting constructions, poles, masts, ducts, inactive wireline transmission infrastructure including cable and fiber, conduits, inspection chambers, manholes, and cabinets, in situations where the market analysis indicates that denial of access or access given under unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level and would not be in the end-user's interest.

Justification: It is proposed to extend the scope of this Article to all passive infrastructure.

Amendment 889 -[modifier]

Amendment 889
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Carlos Zorrinho, Victor Negrescu, Zigmantas Balčytis
S&D
Article 70 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. National regulatory authorities shall take account in particular of the following factors:

(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in the light of the rate of market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection and/or access involved, including the viability of other upstream access products such as access to ducts;

(b) the technological evolution affecting network design and management

(cb) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity available;

(dc) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment;

(ed) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition;

(fe) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual property rights;

(g) the provision of pan-European services.

Justification: Civil engineering access enhances infrastructure-based-competition but should not be treated as the sole or primary remedy. That is what it is necessary to include the complementary obligation of giving access to the entire physical network elements (i.e. passive access). Passive remedies, compared to active ones, remain the main wholesale access products that ensure and promote sustainable infrastructure-based competition. The amendment therefore gives priority to passive over active remedies.

Amendment 890 -[modifier]

Amendment 890
Eva Kaili
S&D
Article 70 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. National regulatory authorities shall take account in particular of the following factors:

(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in the light of the rate of market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection and/or access involved, including the viability of other upstream access products such as access to ducts;

(b) the technological evolution affecting network design and management

(cb) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity available;

(dc) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment;

(ed) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition;

(fe) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual property rights;

(g) the provision of pan-European services.

Amendment 891 -[modifier]

Amendment 891
Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 70 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. National regulators should however not impose access to ducts, conduits, inspection chambers, manholes, and cabinets from wholesale-only operators in the sense of Article 77, when these operators offer a viable and similar alternative means of access to end-users in accordance with Article 3(3) of the Directive 2014/61/EU.

Justification: In order to make the business model of vertically separate undertakings sustainable, wholesale only operators should not be obliged to provide access to their ducts to for example vertically integrated operators. This would take away economic incentives of the latter to use the networks of wholesale only operators and put at risk the prospective returns of investors in wholesale only networks.

Amendment 892 -[modifier]

Amendment 892
Kaja Kallas
ALDE
Article 70 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. A national regulatory authority shall ensure that where access to civil engineering such as access to ducts is limited due to availability, alternatives means of access such as dark fiber are imposed in accordance with article 71.

Justification: Access to civil engineering is important to contribute to sustainable competition, however it should take into account the limited availability or physical constraints of granting such access

Amendment 893 -[modifier]

Amendment 893
Pavel Telička
ALDE
Article 70 – paragraph 2

2. National regulatory authorities may impose obligations on an operator to provide access in accordance with this Article, irrespective of whether the assets that are affected by the obligation are part of the relevant market in accordance with the market analysis, provided that the obligation is necessary and proportionate to meet the objectives of Article 3.

2. National regulatory authorities shall take account in particular of the following factors:'''''(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in the light of the rate of market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection and/or access involved, including the viability of other upstream access products such as access to ducts;'''''(b) the technological evolution affecting network design and management'''''(c) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity available;'''''(d) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment;'''''(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition;'''''(f) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual property rights;'''''(g) the provision of pan-European services.

Amendment 894 -[modifier]

Amendment 894
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 70 – paragraph 2

2. National regulatory authorities may impose obligations on an operator to provide access in accordance with this Article, irrespective of whether the assets that are affected by the obligation are part of the relevant market in accordance with the market analysis, provided that the obligation is necessary and proportionate to meet the objectives of Article 3.

2. National regulatory authorities shall take account in particular of the following factors:

Justification: Civil engineering access enhances infrastructure-based-competition but should not be treated as the sole or primary remedy. That is what it is necessary to include the complementary obligation of giving access to the entire physical network elements (i.e. passive access). Passive remedies, compared to active ones, remain the main wholesale access products that ensure and promote sustainable infrastructure-based competition. The amendment therefore gives priority to passive over active remedies.

Amendment 895 -[modifier]

Amendment 895
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 70 – paragraph 2 – point a (new)

(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in the light of the rate of market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection and/or access involved, including the viability of other upstream access products such as access to ducts;

Amendment 896 -[modifier]

Amendment 896
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 70 – paragraph 2 – point b (new)

(b) the technological evolution affecting network design and management

Amendment 897 -[modifier]

Amendment 897
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 70 – paragraph 2 – point c (new)

(c) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity available;

Amendment 898 -[modifier]

Amendment 898
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 70 – paragraph 2 – point d (new)

(d) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment;

Amendment 899 -[modifier]

Amendment 899
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 70 – paragraph 2 – point e (new)

(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure based competition;

Amendment 900 -[modifier]

Amendment 900
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 70 – paragraph 2 – point f (new)

(f) the provision of pan-European services.


Amendment 901 -[modifier]

Amendment 901
Anna Záborská, Ivan Štefanec
EPP
Article 70 a (new)

Article 70 a

Access obligations beyond civil engineering

In geographic areas where two access networks can be expected on a forward-looking basis and where at least one of the network operators offers wholesale access to any interested undertaking, on reasonable commercial terms permitting sustainable competition on the retail market, national regulatory authorities shall not impose or maintain wholesale access obligations, beyond access to civil infrastructure according to Article 3 of Directive 2014/61/EU.



Amendment 907 +[modifier]

Amendment 907
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Only where a national regulatory authority concludes that the obligations imposed in accordance with Article 70 would not on their own lead to the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3, it may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, in situations where the national regulatory authority considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, and would not be in the end-user's interest.

A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, in situations where the national regulatory authority considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, and would not be in the end-user's interest.



Amendment 908 +[modifier]

Amendment 908
José Blanco López, Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández, Soledad Cabezón Ruiz
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Only where a national regulatory authority concludes that the obligations imposed in accordance with Article 70 would not on their own lead to the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3, it may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, in situations where the national regulatory authority considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, and would not be in the end-user's interest.

A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and associated facilities, in situations where the national regulatory authority considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, and would not be in the end-user's interest.


Same as AM 907


Amendment 914 -[modifier]

Amendment 914
Pavel Telička
EFDD
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a

(a) to give third parties access to specified network elements and/or facilities, as appropriate including access to network elements which are either not active or physical and/or active or virtual unbundled access to the local loop;

(a) to give third parties access to specified non-physical network elements including active services;


This amendment gives the priority of passive access over active access remedies which is not always the best solution especially for enabling small actors to enter the market and thus foster competition.


Amendment 916 -[modifier]

Amendment 916
David Borrelli, Dario Tamburrano
EPP
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a

(a) to give third parties access to specified network elements and/or facilities, as appropriate including access to network elements which are either not active or physical and/or active or virtual unbundled access to the local loop;

(a) to give third parties access to specified non-physical network elements including active services;

Justification: This amendment aims at ensuring the priority of passive access over active access remedies.



Amendment 917 +[modifier]

Amendment 917
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a

(a) to give third parties access to specified network elements and/or facilities, as appropriate including access to network elements which are either not active or physical and/or active or virtual unbundled access to the local loop;

(a) to give third parties access to specified non-physical network elements and/or facilities, as appropriate including active services under transparent and regulated tariff conditions, which at least make it possible to reproduce the tariffs of the retail offers of the regulated operator;


This AM shall be adopted together with AM 923


Amendment 923 +[modifier]

Amendment 923
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point a a (new)

(a a) obligations to share with third parties specified network elements, including shared access to the metallic local loop and sub-loop as well as shared access to fibre loops and fibre terminating segments, including wavelength division multiplexing and similar sharing solutions;


This AM shall be adopted together with AM 917


Amendment 932 -[modifier]

Amendment 932
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point e

(e) to provide co-location or other forms of associated facilities sharing;

deleted


Amendment 933 -[modifier]

Amendment 933
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point f

(f) to provide specified services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to-end services to users, including facilities for software emulated networks or roaming on mobile networks;

deleted


Amendment 935 -[modifier]

Amendment 935
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point g

(g) to provide access to operational support systems or similar software systems necessary to ensure fair competition in the provision of services;

deleted


Amendment 936 -[modifier]

Amendment 936
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point h

(h) to interconnect networks or network facilities;

deleted


Amendment 937 -[modifier]

Amendment 937
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point i

(i) to provide access to associated services such as identity, location and presence service.

deleted


Amendment 939 +[modifier]

Amendment 939
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. When national regulatory authorities are considering the appropriateness of imposing any of the possible specific obligations referred in paragraph 1, and in particular when assessing, in conformity with the principle of proportionality, whether and how such obligations should be imposed, they shall analyse whether other forms of access to wholesale inputs either on the same or a related wholesale market, would already be sufficient to address the identified problem at the retail level. The assessment shall include existing or prospective commercial access offers, regulated access pursuant to Article 59, or existing or contemplated regulated access to other wholesale inputs pursuant to this Article. They shall take account in particular of the following factors:

2. They shall take account in particular of the following factors:

Justification: Before intervening in wholesale markets, NRAs would have to demonstrate that their intervention corresponds to a retail problem. The focus on retail markets would lead to the automatic de-regulation of wholesale markets in many cases, and would ultimately lead to the monopolisation or ‘duopolisation’. In addition, retail competition of the kind where all retail providers are dependent on one wholesale provider is not sustainable in the long run and only amounts to ‘fake-competition’ and could lead to higher prices and less innovation and choice for end-users.The mere existence of a “prospective commercial access offer” should not be a sufficient basis upon which to require regulatory forbearance – if it were, then the absence of take-up could result in a de facto unregulated monopoly (see also BEREC opinion BoR (16) 213 (p. 7)).


Amendment 948 ++[modifier]

Amendment 948
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in the light of the rate of market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection and/or access involved, including the viability of other upstream access products such as access to ducts;

deleted


The role of NRAs is not to secure the investments of operators but to ensure a harmonious development in the territories and give to all equal access to the market and services.

Amendment 949 -[modifier]

Amendment 949
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) the expected technological evolution affecting network design and management

deleted


Amendment 953 ++[modifier]

Amendment 953
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point c

(c) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity available;

deleted


The role of NRAs is not to secure the investments of operators but to ensure a harmonious development in the territories and give to all equal access to the market and services.

Amendment 954 ++[modifier]

Amendment 954
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment with particular regard to investments in and risk levels associated with very high capacity networks;

deleted


The role of NRAs is not to secure the investments of operators but to ensure a harmonious development in the territories and give to all equal access to the market and services.

Amendment 955 +[modifier]

Amendment 955
Fulvio Martusciello
EPP
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment with particular regard to investments in and risk levels associated with very high capacity networks;

(d) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment;


Amendment 959 +[modifier]

Amendment 959
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point e

(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition and to sustainable competition based on co-investment in networks;

deleted


Amendment 961 -[modifier]

Amendment 961
José Blanco López, Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández, Soledad Cabezón Ruiz
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point e

(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition and to sustainable competition based on co-investment in networks;

(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition and to sustainable competition based on innovative commercial business models such as, but not only, co-investment in networks;

Justification: Recital 166 introduces the need to take into account newly concluded voluntary agreements between operators in order to provide regulatory flexibility. Co-investment is a particular case, but not the only one

Amendment 965 +[modifier]

Amendment 965
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point e

(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition and to sustainable competition based on co-investment in networks;

(e) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition;

Justification: Concerning, co-investment schemes: some of them have the potential to create ineffectively competitive market outcomes. The Commission’s proposal includes criteria in Annex IV as well as conditions against which co-investment offers should be judged (compliance with which would entitle the co-investment to effectively benefit from a regulatory holiday). However, these do not provide sufficient competition protections to warrant a relaxation of SMP regulation. It is also worth bearing in mind that co-investments by their nature can lead to coordinated behaviour, which in turn could produce uncompetitive outcomes. Ultimately, the resulting reduction in competition could lead to higher prices and less innovation and choice for end-users. In its opinion BoR (16) 213 (p. 7), BEREC recognises “[T]he risk is that in seeking to incentivise investment through regulatory forbearance, the Commission’s proposals could undermine competition, which in turn would impact on the virtuous cycle of competition- and demand driven investment. The Commission’s proposals would therefore undermine their own ultimate goal of increasing high-speed connectivity.”


Amendment 968 ++[modifier]

Amendment 968
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point g

(g) the provision of pan-European services.

deleted


The role of NRAs is not to secure the investments of operators but to ensure a harmonious development in the territories and give to all equal access to the market and services.

Amendment 969 ++[modifier]

Amendment 969
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point g a (new)

(g a) the existence of a broad choice of offers and providers for fixed and mobile access, for each consumer in Europe irrespective of their place of residence;


The role of NRAs is not to secure the investments of operators but to ensure a harmonious development in the territories and give to all equal access to the market and services.

Amendment 970 ++[modifier]

Amendment 970
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point g b (new)

(g b) the development of a democratic society in the digital era allowing free access to information and expression for all citizens of Europe;


Amendment 971 --[modifier]

Amendment 971
Anna Záborská, Ivan Štefanec
EPP
Article 71 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. In order to account for the long-term interest of end-users, national regulatory authorities should focus more on facilitating network investments by all operators. Regulation should not be to the detriment of innovative developments, in particular very high capacity networks, software defined networks and network function virtualisation. Only where strictly necessary to safeguard competition and where no alternative access possibilities, including access based on commercial agreements, exist, regulated access should be maintained in an appropriate and balanced manner, i.e. at a single network layer. Regulated access at multiple network layers has led to unnecessarily high complexity with regard to the consistency of regulated wholesale products at different network layers and unduly restricts flexibility and commercial freedom in the dynamic telecoms market environment. Limiting access to a single network layer that best addresses the problem identified at the retail level will significantly reduce regulatory costs and the potential for regulatory gaming by market players, leading to more efficient and appropriate outcomes. In this regard, national regulatory authorities should assess whether active or passive access is more appropriate in consideration of national or local circumstances. As unbundling is detrimental to network investments by allowing 'cream-skimming' of the most profitable customers at average cost, there should no longer be an obligation to provide unbundled access, which undermines investment models based on product and price differentiation.


Amendment 973 -[modifier]

Amendment 973
Anna Záborská, Ivan Štefanec
EPP
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations relating to cost recovery and price controls, including obligations for cost orientation of prices and obligations concerning cost accounting systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection and/or access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack of effective competition means that the operator concerned may sustain prices at an excessively high level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users.

A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose obligations relating to cost recovery and price controls, including obligations concerning cost accounting systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection and/or access, in situations where a market analysis indicates a lack of effective competition. A national regulatory authority may only impose price controls that ensure fair and reasonable prices and do not negatively impact investments. When applied, a price control shall meet the following cumulative conditions:'''''(a) the price control ensures recovery of all investments connected to the deployment of new networks and fully incorporates the risks associated with these investments;'''''(b) the price control does not lead to a situation where the investing operator is put at a disadvantage compared to non-investing operators or lead to a situation under which an investment would not have been made in the first place;'''''(c) the price control avoids undue profit margins for access seekers to the detriment of the investing operator and appropriately reflects differences in the risks taken by different access seekers.


Amendment 976 +[modifier]

Amendment 976
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

In determining whether or not price control obligations would be appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks. In particular, to encourage investments by the operator, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator. Where the national regulatory authorities deem price controls appropriate, they shall allow the operator a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project.

To encourage investments by the operator, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator. Where the national regulatory authorities deem price controls appropriate, they shall allow the operator a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project.

Justification: Price control is an essential element of access regulation and should not be conditioned to any other criteria.


Amendment 977 +[modifier]

Amendment 977
Kaja Kallas
ALDE
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

In determining whether or not price control obligations would be appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks. In particular, to encourage investments by the operator, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator. Where the national regulatory authorities deem price controls appropriate, they shall allow the operator a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project.

In determining whether or not price control obligations would be appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks. In particular, to encourage investments by the operator, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator.

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


Amendment 978 -[modifier]

Amendment 978
Anna Záborská, Ivan Štefanec
EPP
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

In determining whether or not price control obligations would be appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks. In particular, to encourage investments by the operator, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator. Where the national regulatory authorities deem price controls appropriate, they shall allow the operator a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project.

In determining whether or not price control obligations would be appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account long-term end-user interests related to investment in, the deployment of and take-up of next-generation networks. In particular, to encourage investments by the operator, including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the operator. Where the national regulatory authorities deem price controls appropriate, they shall allow the operator a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project.


Amendment 979 ++[modifier]

Amendment 979
Kaja Kallas
ALDE
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

National regulatory authorities shall not impose or maintain obligations pursuant to this Article, where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present and that any obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 67 to 71, including in particular any economic replicability test imposed in accordance with Article 68 ensures effective and non discriminatory access.

deleted

Justification: In accordance with rule 104 of the rules of procedure, this amendment is necessary for pressing reasons related to the internal logic of the text


Current provisions for co-investment practices do not allow non-profit or local ISPs to participate in the investments, restricting this opportunity only to larger and incumbent actors. Although Community Networks (CN) and local actors have proven successful in connecting underprivileged communities both in urban and rural areas, it would be only normal to considered them equal members of the telecoms ecosystem, thus giving them fair and equal access to co-investment opportunities. Moreover, co-investment in a certain area must be considered as an oligopoly of a few powerful actors that work as a cartel. This is thus not acceptable to reduce the obligations. Furthermore, the access to co-investment agreement shall be affordable for small operators.

Amendment 980 ++[modifier]

Amendment 980
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

National regulatory authorities shall not impose or maintain obligations pursuant to this Article, where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present and that any obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 67 to 71, including in particular any economic replicability test imposed in accordance with Article 68 ensures effective and non discriminatory access.

deleted

Justification: Current provisions for co-investment practices do not allow non-profit or local ISPs to participate in the investments, restricting this opportunity only to larger and incumbent actors. Although Community Networks (CN) and local actors have proven succesful in connecting underprivileged communities both in urban and rural areas, it would be only normal to considered them equal members of the telecoms ecosystem, thus giving them fair and equal access to co-investment opportunities.Moreover, co-investment in a certain area must be considered as an oligopoly of a few powerful actors that work as a cartel.This is thus not acceptable to reduce the obligations. Furthermore, the access to co-investment agreement shall be affordable for small operators.


Amendment 982 -[modifier]

Amendment 982
Anna Záborská, Ivan Štefanec
EPP
Article 72 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

National regulatory authorities shall not impose or maintain obligations pursuant to this Article, where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present and that any obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 67 to 71, including in particular any economic replicability test imposed in accordance with Article 68 ensures effective and non discriminatory access.

National regulatory authorities shall not impose or maintain obligations pursuant to this Article, either for new network elements in case a network roll-out contributes to the availability of very-high capacity networks or where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present and that any obligations imposed in accordance with Articles 67 to 71, including in particular any economic replicability test imposed in accordance with Article 68 ensures effective non discrimination of access.


Amendment 983 -[modifier]

Amendment 983
Anna Záborská, Ivan Štefanec
EPP
Article 72 – paragraph 3

3. Where an operator has an obligation regarding the cost orientation of its prices, the burden of proof that charges are derived from costs including a reasonable rate of return on investment shall lie with the operator concerned. For the purpose of calculating the cost of efficient provision of services, national regulatory authorities may use cost accounting methods independent of those used by the undertaking. National regulatory authorities may require an operator to provide full justification for its prices, and may, where appropriate, require prices to be adjusted.

deleted

Amendment 984 -[modifier]

Amendment 984
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Edouard Martin, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 72 a (new)

Article 72 a

Other access-related obligations

1. A national regulatory authority

may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, impose:

(a) to give third parties access to specified active network elements and services;

(b) to provide specified services on a wholesale basis for resale by third parties;

(c) to negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access;

(d) not to withdraw access to facilities already granted;

(ee) to grant open access to technical interfaces, protocols or other key technologies that are indispensable for the interoperability of services or virtual network services;

(ff) to provide co-location or other forms of associated facilities sharing;

(gg) to provide specified services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to-end services to users, including facilities for software emulated networks or roaming on mobile networks;

(hh) to provide access to operational support systems or similar software systems necessary to ensure fair competition in the provision of services;

(i) to interconnect networks or network facilities;

(j) to provide access to associated services such as identity, location and presence service.

National regulatory authorities may attach to those obligations conditions covering fairness, reasonableness and timeliness.

2. They shall take account in particular of the following factors:

(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in the light of the rate of market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection and/or access involved, including the viability of other upstream access products such as access to ducts;

(b) the technological evolution affecting network design and management

(cb) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity available;

(dc) the initial investment by the facility owner, taking account of any public investment made and the risks involved in making the investment ;

(ed) the need to safeguard competition in the long term, with particular attention to economically efficient infrastructure-based competition;

(fe) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual property rights;

(g) the provision of pan-European services.


Amendment 1001 +[modifier]

Amendment 1001
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Zigmantas Balčytis, Victor Negrescu, Carlos Zorrinho, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Patrizia Toia
S&D
Article 74

Article 74

deleted

Regulatory treatment of new network elements

1.

A national regulatory authority shall not impose obligations as regards new network elements that are part of the relevant market on which it intends to impose or maintain obligations in accordance with Articles 66 and Articles 67 to 72 and that the operator designated as significant market power on that relevant market has deployed or is planning to deploy, if the following cumulative conditions are met:

(a) the deployment of the new network elements is open to co-investment offers according to a transparent process and on terms which favour sustainable competition in the long term including inter alia fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms offered to potential co-investors; flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the commitment provided by each co-investor; possibility to increase such commitment in the future; reciprocal rights awarded by the co-investors after the deployment of the co-invested infrastructure;

(b) the deployment of the new network elements contributes significantly to the deployment of very high capacity networks;

(c) access seekers not participating in the co-investment can benefit from the same quality, speed, conditions and end-user reach as was available before the deployment, either through commercial agreements based on fair and reasonable terms or by means of regulated access maintained or adapted by the national regulatory authority;

When assessing co-investment offers and processes referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph, national regulatory authorities shall ensure that those offers and processes comply with the criteria set out in Annex IV.

Justification: Current framework does not prevent co-investment. While the article may help to facilitate new fiber networks, it will not allow NRAs to intervene efficiently where it becomes necessary. It is problematic that the reference made in Art 74 (b) to the “deployment of very high capacity networks” establishes a hierarchy between the regulatory objectives set out in Article 3. Also, co-investments by their nature can lead to coordinated behaviour, which in turn yield uncompetitive outcomes.


Amendment 1003 +[modifier]

Amendment 1003
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 74 – paragraph 1

1. A national regulatory authority shall not impose obligations as regards new network elements that are part of the relevant market on which it intends to impose or maintain obligations in accordance with Articles 66 and Articles 67 to 72 and that the operator designated as significant market power on that relevant market has deployed or is planning to deploy, if the following cumulative conditions are met:

deleted

(a) the deployment of the new network elements is open to co-investment offers according to a transparent process and on terms which favour sustainable competition in the long term including inter alia fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms offered to potential co-investors; flexibility in terms of the value and timing of the commitment provided by each co-investor; possibility to increase such commitment in the future; reciprocal rights awarded by the co-investors after the deployment of the co-invested infrastructure;

(b) the deployment of the new network elements contributes significantly to the deployment of very high capacity networks;

(c) access seekers not participating in the co-investment can benefit from the same quality, speed, conditions and end-user reach as was available before the deployment, either through commercial agreements based on fair and reasonable terms or by means of regulated access maintained or adapted by the national regulatory authority;

When assessing co-investment offers and processes referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph, national regulatory authorities shall ensure that those offers and processes comply with the criteria set out in Annex IV.

Justification: The proposed provisions on “new network elements” in Article 74 are problematic firstly because the concept remains undefined. Secondly, Article 74 impedes NRAs from intervening on “new network elements” if there are co-investment offers. This could be problematic because SMP operators can use their market position to the detriment of smaller companies. Operators investing in VHC networks should not profit from regulatory holidays. The successful ex-ante regulatory regime should apply as much to VHC networks as to Next Generation Networks and legacy networks (e.g. copper).The explicit reference made in Art 74 (b) to the “deployment of very high capacity networks” establishes a hierarchy between the regulatory objectives set out in Article 3.In addition, co-investment schemes are diverse, and some of them have the potential to create ineffectively competitive market outcomes. While the Commission’s proposal includes criteria in Annex IV as well as conditions against which co-investment offers should be judged (compliance with which would entitle the co-investment to effectively benefit from a regulatory holiday), these do not provide sufficient competition protections to warrant a relaxation of SMP regulation. It is also worth bearing in mind that co-investments by their nature can lead to coordinated behaviour, which in turn could produce uncompetitive outcomes. Deregulation subject to weak safeguards has to be prevented. Independent from the concept of co-investment, commercial agreements must not artificially lead to non-SMP findings and to the removal of the wholesale access obligations that are necessary to enable and maintain sustainable competition and thus consumer well-being in the form of lower prices, increased choice and more innovative products.


Amendment 1045 +[modifier]

Amendment 1045
Evžen Tošenovský
ECR
Article 77

Article 77

deleted

Vertically separate undertakings

1. A national regulatory authority that designates an undertaking which is absent from any retail markets for electronic communications services as having significant market power in one or several wholesale markets in accordance with Article 65 shall consider whether that undertaking has the following characteristics:

(a) all companies and business units within the undertaking, including all companies that are controlled but not necessarily wholly owned by the same ultimate owner(s), only have activities, current and planned for the future, in wholesale markets for electronic communications services and therefore do not have activities in any retail market for electronic communications services provided to end-users in the Union;

(b) the undertaking does not hold an exclusive agreement, or an agreement which de facto amounts to an exclusive agreement, with a single and separate undertaking operating downstream that is active in any retail market for electronic communications services provided to private or commercial end-users.

2. If the national regulatory authority concludes that the conditions laid down in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article are fulfilled, it may only impose on that undertaking obligations pursuant to Articles 70 or 71.

3. The national regulatory authority shall review obligations imposed on the undertaking in accordance with this Article at any time if it concludes that the conditions laid down in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article are no longer met and shall apply Articles 65 to 72, as appropriate.

4. The national regulatory authority shall also review obligations imposed on the undertaking in accordance with this Article if on the basis of evidence of terms and conditions offered by the undertaking to its downstream customers, the authority concludes that competition problems have arisen to the detriment of end-users which require the imposition of one or more obligations provided in Articles 67, 68, 69 or 72, or the modification of the obligations imposed in accordance with paragraph 2.

5. The imposition of obligations and their review in accordance with this Article shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures referred to in Articles 23, 32 and 33.


Amendment 1056 +[modifier]

Amendment 1056
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 79 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that all end-users in their territory have access at an affordable price, in the light of specific national conditions, to available functional internet access and voice communications services at the quality specified in their territory, including the underlying connection, at least at a fixed location.

1. Member States shall ensure that all end-users in their territory have access at an affordable price, in the light of specific national conditions, to available broadband internet access and voice communications services at the quality specified in their territory, including the underlying connection, at least at a fixed location.


Amendment 1057 +[modifier]

Amendment 1057
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Article 79 – paragraph 2

2. Member States shall define the functional internet access service referred to in paragraph 1 with a view to adequately reflect services used by the majority of end-users in their territory. To that end, the functional internet access service shall be capable of supporting the minimum set of services set out in Annex V.

deleted


Amendment 1069 +[modifier]

Amendment 1069
Morten Helveg Petersen
ALDE
Article 92 – paragraph 1

Providers of electronic communications networks or services shall not apply any discriminatory requirements or conditions of access or use to end-users based on the end-user's nationality or place of residence unless such differences are objectively justified.

Providers of electronic communications networks or services shall not apply any discriminatory requirements or conditions of access or use to end-users based on the end-user's nationality or place of residence unless such differences are objectively justified and in compliance with the scope and interpretation of fundamental rights as provided for in Article 52 of the Charter.


Amendment 1078 +[modifier]

Amendment 1078
José Blanco López, Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto, Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández, Soledad Cabezón Ruiz
S&D
Article 94 – paragraph 1

Member States shall not maintain or introduce in their national law end-user protection provisions on the subject-matters covered by this Title and diverging from the provisions laid down in this Title, including more or less stringent provisions to ensure a different level of protection, unless otherwise provided for in this Title.

Member States shall under no circumstance introduce in their national law end-user protection provisions that undermine the provisions laid down in this Title as it constitutes the minimum level of end-user protection to be pursued in the Union.


Amendment 1097 +[modifier]

Amendment 1097
Morten Helveg Petersen
ALDE
Article 114 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. The Commission shall periodically review the application of the fundamental rights safeguard referred to in Article 93. Such review shall be carried out every five year.


Amendment 1099 ++[modifier]

Amendment 1099
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Annex I – part A – point 4

4. Enabling of legal interception by competent national authorities in conformity with Directive 2002/58/EC and Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data'''''54''''' .

deleted

_________________

54 OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.


Amendment 1110 +[modifier]

Amendment 1110
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Dan Nica, Jeppe Kofod, Carlos Zorrinho, Victor Negrescu, Zigmantas Balčytis
S&D
Annex IV

[...]

deleted


Amendment 1130 +[modifier]

Amendment 1130
Michel Reimon
Verts/ALE
Annex IV – paragraph 1 – point c – indent 1

- All undertakings have to be offered fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions for participation in the co-investment agreement relative to the time they join, including in terms of financial consideration required for the acquisition of specific rights, in terms of the protection awarded to the co-investors by those rights both during the building phase and during the exploitation phase, for example by granting indefeasible rights of use (IRUs) for the expected lifetime of the co-invested network and in terms of the conditions for joining and potentially terminating the co-investment agreement. Non-discriminatory terms in this context do not entail that all potential co-investors must be offered exactly the same terms, including financial terms, but that all variations of the terms offered must be justified on the basis of the same objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and predictable criteria such as the number of end user lines committed for.

- All undertakings have to be offered fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions for participation in the co-investment agreement relative to the time they join, including in terms of financial consideration required for the acquisition of specific rights, in terms of access to individual lines, in terms of the protection awarded to the co-investors by those rights both during the building phase and during the exploitation phase, for example by granting indefeasible rights of use (IRUs) for the expected lifetime of the co-invested network and in terms of the conditions for joining and potentially terminating the co-investment agreement. Non-discriminatory terms in this context do not entail that all potential co-investors must be offered exactly the same terms, including financial terms, but that all variations of the terms offered must be justified on the basis of the same objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and predictable criteria such as the number of end user lines committed for.

Justification: Current provisions for co-investment practices do not allow non-profit or local ISPs to participate in the investments, restricting this opportunity only to larger and incumbent actors. Although Community Networks (CN) and local actors have proven successful in connecting underprivileged communities both in urban and rural areas, it would be only normal to considered them equal members of the telecoms ecosystem, thus giving them fair and equal access to co-investment opportunities.


If AM 1110 falls