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The recital states that the "relevant" administrative authorities can issues orders to technical intermediaires imposing them to send warning messages in case of "specific problems".  
 
The recital states that the "relevant" administrative authorities can issues orders to technical intermediaires imposing them to send warning messages in case of "specific problems".  
  
The length of this recital is exceptional for a European directive. It contains provisions that are substantive and should never be included in a recital. It refers to the new drafting of article 33 of the framework directive (compromise amendment 7).
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The length of this recital is exceptional for a European directive. It contains provisions that are substantive and should never be included in a recital (actually their contents does not belong anywhere in a telecommunication regulation directive). It refers to the new drafting of article 33 of the framework directive (compromise amendment 7).
  
This article 33 installs the prinicple that administrative authorities in charge of regulating Internet usage encourage intermediaries to co-operate with the sectors having interest in "the protection and promotion of lawful contents". It precises that this co-operation will in particular follow the rules defined in article 21(4a) (compromise amendment 3).
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This article 33 installs the principle that administrative authorities in charge of regulating Internet usage encourage intermediaries to co-operate with the sectors having interest in "the protection and promotion of lawful contents". It precises that this co-operation will in particular follow the rules defined in article 21(4a) (compromise amendment 3).
  
 
This notion of "personal security" echoes directly amendment 69 from Syed Kamal adopted in the LIBE committee, which authorizes any legal or moral person to process personal data when it is done for security purposes. This amendment aims at the authorisation to process connection data without permission from the user and to enable the technical measures described in amendment 76 from Syed Kamal, also adopted in the LIBE committee. The aim is to make possible for compulsory standardised technical systems to intercept, detect et prevent infringements to IPR, circumventing the judidicial authorities role in authorising or completing these functions.
 
This notion of "personal security" echoes directly amendment 69 from Syed Kamal adopted in the LIBE committee, which authorizes any legal or moral person to process personal data when it is done for security purposes. This amendment aims at the authorisation to process connection data without permission from the user and to enable the technical measures described in amendment 76 from Syed Kamal, also adopted in the LIBE committee. The aim is to make possible for compulsory standardised technical systems to intercept, detect et prevent infringements to IPR, circumventing the judidicial authorities role in authorising or completing these functions.

Version du 3 juillet 2008 à 12:43

English

Examined amendments

Summary

The "compromise" amendments open the door to contractual agreements between technical operators and content producers for massive emailing campaigns requiring the users to install surveillance and content filtering systems. Those systems will be listed by administrative authorities, acting under control of the European Commission, out of effective control from the Parliament or judicial authorities.

Their further impose filters and spyware to internet users, under threat of being sued for copyright infringement, and without any proof other than a computer log. It's a hard version of the three-strike approach known in France as "riposte graduée" ("graduated response").

Voting list

Compromise amendments to reject : 3, 4, 5, 7

Detailed analysis

Recital 12c (compromise amendment 4) describes the so-called "preventive" phase of the "graduated response".

The recital states that the "relevant" administrative authorities can issues orders to technical intermediaires imposing them to send warning messages in case of "specific problems".

The length of this recital is exceptional for a European directive. It contains provisions that are substantive and should never be included in a recital (actually their contents does not belong anywhere in a telecommunication regulation directive). It refers to the new drafting of article 33 of the framework directive (compromise amendment 7).

This article 33 installs the principle that administrative authorities in charge of regulating Internet usage encourage intermediaries to co-operate with the sectors having interest in "the protection and promotion of lawful contents". It precises that this co-operation will in particular follow the rules defined in article 21(4a) (compromise amendment 3).

This notion of "personal security" echoes directly amendment 69 from Syed Kamal adopted in the LIBE committee, which authorizes any legal or moral person to process personal data when it is done for security purposes. This amendment aims at the authorisation to process connection data without permission from the user and to enable the technical measures described in amendment 76 from Syed Kamal, also adopted in the LIBE committee. The aim is to make possible for compulsory standardised technical systems to intercept, detect et prevent infringements to IPR, circumventing the judidicial authorities role in authorising or completing these functions.

Article 22(3) (compromise amendment 5) plans for the standards of surveillance and filtering to be defined by National regulatory authorities under control from the European Commission. The procedure defined in this article does not meet standards of democratic control.

Français

Amendements examinés

Résumé

il s'agit d'ouvrir la porte à la conclusion d'accords contractuels entre opérateurs techniques et producteurs de contenus en vue de lancer des campagnes d'envois de mails en masse intimant aux internautes d'installer des dispositifs de filtrage et de surveillance des contenus. Ces dispositifs seront listés par des autorités administratives, agissant sous le contrôle de la Commission Européenne, hors contrôle effectif du Parlement ou de l'autorité judiciaire.

L'objectif est d'imposer des filtres et des mouchards aux internautes sous la menace de poursuites pour contrefaçon, et ce, sans aucune preuve autre qu'un listing informatique. Il s'agit ni plus ni moins que du mécanisme de riposte graduée version dure.

Liste de vote

Amendement des compromis à rejeter 3, 4, 5, 7

Analyse détaillée du dispositif

Le considérant 12c (amendement de compromis 4) décrit la phase présentée comme "préventive" de la riposte graduée.

Il s'agit de préciser que les autorités administratives chargées de la régulation des usages des internautes peuvent ordonner aux intermédiaires techniques l'envoi de messages en cas de "problèmes particuliers".

Ce considérant, d'une longueur particulièrement remarquable pour un considérant de directive européenne, fait référence à la nouvelle rédaction de l'article 33 de la proposition de directive-cadre concerné (amendementde compromis 7).

Cet article 33 pose le principe selon lequel les autorités administratives chargées de réguler les usages des internautes encouragent les intermédiaires techniques à coopérer avec les secteurs concernés par "la protection et la promotion des contenus licites". Il précise que cette coopération se fera notamment suivant les règles fixées à l'article 21(4a) (amendement de compromis 3).

Cet article 21(4a) stipule que les autorités administratives régulant les usages des internautes peuvent ordonner, quand cela est "approprié", sans doute en cas de "problèmes particuliers", aux fournisseurs d'accès l'envoi de messages indiquant les principaux usages illicites connus sur internet et de leurs conséquences. Ils devront de plus proposer à leurs abonnés les moyens permettant d'assurer leur "sécurité personnelle".

Cette notion de "sécurité personnelle" renvoie directement à l'amendement 69 de Syed Kamal adopté en commission LIBE qui autorise à toute personne légale ou morale le traitement de données personnelles dès qu'elle est pratiquée à des fins de sécurité.

Cet amendement vise à autoriser le traitement de données de connexion sans autorisation de l'utilisateur aux mesures techniques décrites à l'amendement 76 de Syed Kamal également adopté en commission LIBE. Il s'agit que des dispositifs techniques obligatoires standardisés interceptent, détectent et préviennent des atteintes à la propriété intellectuelle en lieu et place des juges.

Comme le prévoit l'article 22(3), ces standards de surveillance et de filtrage seront fixés par les autorités admnistratives nationales de régulation sous le contrôle de la Commission européenne (Amendement de compromis 5). La procédure utilisée par cet article est tout sauf démocratique.